DEDC Committee Meeting

THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

OTTAWA, Thursday, December 1, 2022
(20)

[English]

Pursuant to the order of the Senate of Thursday, September 22, 2022 and the order of the House of Commons of Thursday, June 23, 2022, the Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency met this day in room 025-B, West Block, and with videoconference, at 6:31 p.m. ET, the joint chair, the Honourable Senator Gwen Boniface, presiding.

Representing the Senate: The Honourable Senators Boniface, Carignan, P.C., Harder, P.C. and Patterson(Nunavut) (4).

Representing the House of Commons: Rachel Bendayan, Larry Brock, Rhéal Éloi Fortin, Matthew Green, Glen Motz, Yasir Naqvi and Arif Virani (7).

Acting members from the House of Commons: Kevin Lamoureux for Arif Virani (1).

Participating in the meeting: Angus Wilson, Acting Procedural Clerk, Senate Committees Directorate; Stephanie Feldman, Colin Sawatzky and Iryna Zazulya, analysts, Library of Parliament.

Pursuant to the order of reference adopted by the Senate on March 3, 2022 and the House of Commons on Wednesday, March 2, 2022, the committee continued its review of the exercise of powers and the performance of duties and functions pursuant to the declaration of emergency that was in effect from Monday, February 14, 2022, to Wednesday, February 23, 2022.

WITNESSES:

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre:

Marie-Hélène Chayer, Executive Director.

Privy Council Office:

Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor;

Martin Green, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Intelligence Assessment;

Mike MacDonald, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence.

GiveSendGo:

Jacob Wells, Co-Founder (by videoconference).

Jody Thomas made a statement and, together with Marie-Hélène Chayer, Martin Green and Mike MacDonald, answered questions.

At 6:56 p.m., Mr. Green took the chair.

At 7:01 p.m., the Honourable Senator Boniface took the chair.

At 7:43 p.m., the committee suspended.

At 7:50 p.m., the committee resumed.

Mr. Motz gave notice of the following motion:

That the joint chairs be directed to present the following interim report to each House forthwith:

1. The Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, acting as the Parliamentary Review Committee under section 62 of the Emergencies Act, and pursuant to its orders of reference from the House of Commons and the Senate, adopted on March 2, 2022, and March 3, 2022, respectively, has been reviewing the exercise of powers and the performance of duties and functions pursuant to the declaration of a public order emergency that was in effect from February 14 to 23, 2022.
2. Despite a parliamentary secretary urging an interpretation of this mandate such that it “does not have a retrospective element whatsoever vis-à-vis what happened prior to the invocation of the declaration” (Evidence, March 24, 2022, page 5), your committee, at its meeting on April 5, 2022, adopted a motion that it would study
   

“the options that the Government of Canada utilized during the invocation of the Emergencies Act and enumerated in the Proclamation Declaring a Public Order Emergency; [and] That in this study of each option and for the committee’s final report, the committee consider the necessity, implementation, and impact of that option….”

3. To that end, one of the areas of significant interest in the questioning of witnesses throughout the course of your committee’s work has been whether the necessary thresholds for the government to declare a public order emergency had been satisfied.
4. Given the particular relevance to the issues which will be addressed in this interim report, your committee wishes to set them out below.
5. Subsection 17(1) of the Emergencies Act provides that
   When the Governor in Council believes, on reasonable grounds, that a public order emergency exists and necessitates the taking of special temporary measures for dealing with the emergency, the Governor in Council, after such consultation as is required by section 25, may, by proclamation, so declare.
6. Section 16 of the Emergencies Act offers pertinent definitions:
   

   public order emergency means an emergency that arises from threats to the security of Canada and that is so serious as to be a national emergency;
   threats to the security of Canada has the meaning assigned by section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

7. A “national emergency” is, meanwhile, defined by section 3 of the Emergencies Act:
   
   For the purposes of this Act, a national emergency is an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that
   

(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.

8. Finally, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act definition of “threats to the security of Canada”, sometimes dubbed “the CSIS Act threshold”, which is imported into the Emergencies Act, is as follows:
   

   threats to the security of Canada means
   

(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,
(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,
(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and
(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,
but does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).

9. The significance of these thresholds was explained to your committee by the Honourable Perrin Beatty, P.C., O.C., who, as Minister of National Defence, was the sponsor of the former Bill C-77 which enacted the Emergencies Act—or the law’s so-called “author”—and who appeared before your committee on March 29, 2022.
10. Mr. Beatty spoke of the choice of the CSIS Act threshold as a deliberate one “because of the care that had gone into writing it” (Evidence, page 17). He continued,
    

A public order emergency must meet two stringent tests. The first is to establish the existence of a severe emergency that cannot effectively be dealt with under any other law of Canada. The second is that it must meet a definition of threats to the security of Canada that was drafted to protect Canadians' rights and that specifically provides for “lawful advocacy, protest or dissent”. (Evidence, page 17)

11. The Honourable David Lametti, P.C., K.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, appeared before your committee on April 26, 2022. When asked whether he had received any written opinions that the Emergencies Act should be invoked, he declined to answer on the basis of solicitor-client privilege (Evidence, page 20).
12. Similarly, while claiming solicitor-client privilege when he was asked what facts or considerations were provided in giving advice in relation to the CSIS Act threshold, Mr. Lametti commented,
    

First of all, the document that we tabled goes through the nature of the various threats across the country, including some of the threats that you very rightly identified in the way that you framed your question. These, we felt, met the question of serious threats to persons under the CSIS Act definition—primarily that. There is also the economic damage, which could be considered part of the property question. (Evidence, page 21).

13. In the face of this claim, your committee, on May 31, 2022, exercised its authority to send for persons, papers and records and ordered the production of
    

all security assessments and legal opinions which the government relied upon in determining that (a) the threshold of “threats to security of Canada”, as defined by section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, required by section 16 of the Emergencies Act, had been met; (b) the thresholds required by paragraphs 3(a) or (b) of the Emergencies Act, concerning a “national emergency” had been met; (c) the situation could not “be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada”, as required by section 3 of the Emergencies Act….

14. François Daigle, Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General of Canada, replied to this order, on June 29, 2022, writing, “Upon full consideration, it is our Department’s determination that all legal opinions in our holdings that would be responsive to the Committee’s order are subject to solicitor-client privilege.” He added, “I confirm that I am unable to produce legal opinions as sought in the Committee’s order.”
15. At its next meeting, on September 22, 2022, your committee agreed to
    

deem the evidence, including testimony and documents, received by, and published on the websites of, … the Public Order Emergency Commission, in relation to the February 2022 public order emergency and matters consequential to it, to have been received by this Committee and may be used in its reports….

16. The matter of the interpretation of the thresholds, including the CSIS Act threshold, has lately become a central issue in the proceedings before the Public Order Emergency Commission.
17. According to a pre-hearing interview held with Commission counsel, David Vigneault, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
    

stated that at no point did the Service assess that the protests in Ottawa or elsewhere …. constituted a threat to the security of Canada as defined by section 2 of the CSIS Act, and that CSIS cannot investigate activity constituting lawful protest….

Mr. Vigneault emphasized that the threshold imposed by the CSIS Act and under which the Service operates is very specific. For example, the determination that something may not constitute a threat to national security under section 2 of the Act does not preclude a determination that a national security threat under a broader definition, or from the perspective of the public, does exist. (Commission document WTS.00000060, page 5)

18. Despite February’s protests, “at no point”, constituting a threat so as to trigger the Service’s own investigative thresholds—which, under section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, is based on reasonable grounds to suspect, a much lower legal standard than the Governor in Council’s burden, under section 17 of the Emergencies Act, of reasonable grounds to believe—Mr. Vigneault recommended to the Prime Minister that a public order emergency be declared, “based on both his understanding that the Emergencies Act definition of threat to the security of Canada was broader than the CSIS Act, as well as based on his opinion of everything he had seen to that point” (Commission document WTS.00000079, page 8).
19. In his public testimony, on November 21, 2022, Mr. Vigneault confirmed he had been given advice encouraging him to apply a broader definition to the Emergencies Act’s CSIS Act threshold:
    

    So when that was first brought up, the fact that the Emergencies Act was using the same words as the CSIS Act to define the threat, so imported into the Emergencies Act, I needed to understand for myself and for, you know, the course of this, what was the implication of that.
    

And that’s when I was assured that, you know, they were—it was a separate understanding. You know, the confines of the CSIS Act, the same words, based on legal interpretation, jurisprudence, Federal Court rulings and so on, there was a very clear understanding of what those words meant in the confines of the CSIS Act, and what I was reassured by, is that there was, you know, in the context of the Emergencies Act there was to be a separate interpretation based on the confines of that Act. (Commission transcript, page 58)

20. Under cross-examination by counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), Mr. Vigneault acknowledged that this was the result of a legal opinion he sought from the Department of Justice (Commission transcript, page 95).
21. This novel interpretation of a “broader definition” became a theme in the evidence given by ministers and senior officials before the Commission.
22. Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, appeared before the Commission on November 17, 2022. She asserted, “My understanding is that the Emergencies Act is assigned a meaning as defined in the CSIS Act but is not limited by the CSIS Act”, and that “it can go beyond what the Act says which is a threat to the security of Canada” (Commission transcript, pages 238 and 239).
23. When cross-examined by CCLA counsel, on November 17, 2022, on the threshold “in the Emergencies Act [being] tied exclusively and exhaustively to the definition in the CSIS Act”, Ms. Thomas answered, “The Federal Government legal opinion is different” (Commission transcript, page 271).
24. For her part, Janice Charette, the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, who appeared on November 18, 2022, explained, “That’s a separate process by the Governor in Council which relies on the definition that has a different construct.” (Commission transcript, page 197)
25. Nathalie Drouin, the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council and Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, and a former Deputy Attorney General, who appeared on a panel with Ms. Charette, offered this perspective under cross-examination:
    

    the idea was to make sure that we interpret, avec les adaptations nécessaires, the incorporation by reference….
    

I guess what I’m saying here is when the Legislator adopted the Emergency Act versus when the Legislator adopted CSIS Act, it was for different purposes. The purpose of doing an investigation under the CSIS Act is not the same purpose of triggering or invoking the Emergency Act for public order emergency. (Commission transcript, page 218)

26. The Honourable Bill Blair, P.C., C.O.M., M.P., President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness, told the Commission, on November 21, 2022, “for the purposes of the Emergencies Act that definition I believe has a broader application that is contained within that definition.” (Commission transcript, page 309)
27. The Honourable Marco Mendicino, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety asserted that “the threshold was met in the broader interpretation of the law.” (Commission transcript, page 197)
28. Meanwhile, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc, P.C., K.C., M.P., Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities, who also appeared on November 22, 2022, assured the Commission that “My colleague, David Lametti, will be here tomorrow. He’ll be able, I'm sure, to speak directly to the legal test that the government was using and concluded when the Governor in Council made the decision.” (Commission transcript, page 296)
29.  Mr. Lametti, for his part, when he appeared on November 23, 2022, attempted to square the circle on the interpretation of the threshold: “while it is the same standard of the same magnitude, the interpretation of that standard is being done according to a wider set of criteria by a very different set of people with a different goal in mind, and that goal is given by the Emergencies Act and not the CSIS Act.” (Commission transcript, page 81)
30.  He later clarified,
    

The threshold, as applied, as you’ve seen in testimony before this Commission, has evolved. The rules of thumb for interpreting that have evolved. The purpose of that Act is very different…. the very same words will have, not a wider meaning, but can be—will have a wider area of interpretation, according to the very structure of the Emergencies Act. And I think that is the interpretation that I would put to you as the one that best bears out in practice and is correct. (Commission transcript, pages 83 and 84)

31. Unfortunately, though, when he was asked to explain the assurances which Mr. Vigneault spoke about, and which are quoted above, Mr. Lametti was unable to answer (Commission transcript, page 170).
32. The Right Honourable Justin Trudeau, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister, was the final witness before the Commission on November 25, 2022, and he was also asked about the CSIS Act threshold issue. For his part, Mr. Trudeau explained,
    

The use of the definition in the CSIS Act, as I said before, has two very different contexts from the use of it by CSIS and the use of it in invocation of a public order emergency. The context is different, the purpose is different, the decision maker is different. The requirements around it, the inputs are different. (Commission transcript, pages 72 and 73)

33. Suffice it to say, the outstanding issue about the novel—and what some, like the CCLA, have called “creative”—legal interpretation has become a very salient issue in the issues before both your committee and the Commission. Indeed, it has been an irritant to more than just some of the members of your committee.
34. Commission counsel Gordon Cameron remarked, at the conclusion of Mr. Lametti’s examination, that the Commission had “attempted to find a way to lift the veil that has made such a black box of what has turned out to be a central issue before the hearing,” lamenting that “we just regret that it ends up being an absence of transparency on the part of the government in this proceeding.” (Commission transcript, page 171)
35. The Honourable Paul Rouleau, the Commission’s Commissioner, indeed, added to this observation,
    

as was mentioned by Commission Counsel, there’s an issue of the reasonableness of it. And I’m having a little trouble, and I don’t know if you can help me, how we assess reasonableness when we don’t know what they were acting on. And do we just presume they were acting in good faith without knowing the basis or structure within which they had made that decision? And you know of what I speak. (Commission transcript, page 176)

36. Essentially, it boils down to an argument of “just trust us” as to the justification for a proclamation of a public order emergency which allows the federal Cabinet both to legislate by decree and to do so on matters which are normally a matter of provincial jurisdiction.
37. Why the government would take such a course of action and remain so opaque on this one area begs many questions, invites a lot of speculation, and prompts a search of other evidence in order to draw inferences.
38. For example, as other documents adduced before the Commission came to light, it became apparent that Mr. Lametti may have long been an advocate for strong action, up and including the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
39. Notably, on the third day of the protests, he texted his chief of staff, “Do we have a contingency for these trucks to be removed tomorrow or Tuesday?... What normative authority do we have or is some order needed? EA?” (Commission document SSM.CAN.00007845_REL.0001). By February 2, 2022, he was texting Mr. Mendicino, “You need to get the police to move. And the [Canadian Armed Forces] if necessary.” (Commission document SSM.CAN.00007851_REL.0001)
40.  Meanwhile, Mr. Lametti’s interventions at a February 5, 2022, meeting prompted Royal Canadian Mounted Police Assistant Commissioner Mark Flynn, M.O.M., to remark to his colleagues in a group chat, “When the AG talks like this, we better get our own plan going”. Minutes earlier, in the same group chat, RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki, C.O.M., wrote, “I need to calm him [down]”, then, contemporaneously with Assistant Commissioner Flynn’s remark about Mr. Lametti, added, “ok so calm is not in the cards” (Commission document PB.NSC.CAN.00008043_REL.0001).
41. During the ten minutes immediately following Mr. Lametti’s intervention which had caused such a stir, Commissioner Lucki sent Ontario Provincial Police Commissioner Thomas Carrique, O.O.M., several messages, including:
    
    • “Between you and I only, GoC losing/lost confidence in OPS…we gotta get to safe action/enforcement”
    • “Cause if they want to go to Emergency Measures Act, you or may be brought in to lead…not something I want”
    • “Trying to calm them down, but not easy when they see cranes, structures, horses, bouncing castles in downtown Ottawa”
    • “Any suggestions for calming them?” (Commission document OPP00004583)
42. Could it be that the Attorney General (and possibly others of his Cabinet colleagues) was so committed to the invocation of the Emergencies Act that any legal advice was moulded to shape the desired answer?
43. Certainly, doubts about the strength of the case for invoking the Emergencies Act are acknowledged by Ms. Charette in her February 14, 2022, memorandum to Mr. Trudeau recommending the declaration of a public order emergency: “In PCO’s view, this fits within the statutory parameters defining threats to the security of Canada, though this conclusion may be vulnerable to challenge.” (Commission document SSM.NSC.CAN.00003224_REL.0001, page 8)
44. These issues implore your committee to revisit its earlier orders for production of the legal opinions which the government relied upon—both for the benefit of your committee’s work, but also that of the Public Order Emergency Commission. As Mr. Beatty had explained to your committee, when he appeared on March 29, 2022,
    

If you were looking at the actions taken by the government flowing from the invocation and if you uncover evidence indicating that the invocation of the act was inappropriate, then everything that flowed from it was inappropriate, as well. It seems to me that they’re part and parcel of the same thing. (Evidence, page 19)

45. It is incumbent, for full transparency, for there to be full disclosure of the legal opinions which the government relied upon in declaring the first-ever public order emergency in Canada, so that we can determine whether it was appropriate or inappropriate. We have questions which we want answered.
46. The preeminent right of committees to obtain answers to their questions stems from the Houses’ authority to institute and conduct inquiries and the power to send for persons, papers and records. These parliamentary privileges are rooted in the preamble and section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and section 4 of the Parliament of Canada Act. These powers were delegated by both Houses to your committee through the Houses’ orders establishing the Committee.
47. Given their constitutional nature, a committee’s powers supersede statutory law and other privileges, such as solicitor-client privilege. With regard to papers, there is no limit on the types of papers that can be requested; the only prerequisite is that the papers exist in hard copy or electronic format, and that they are located in Canada. They can be papers originating from or in the possession of governments, or from the private sector and civil society (House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 3^rd ed., page 984; see also Senate Procedure in Practice, pages 199 and 200).
48. In practice, committees may encounter situations where the authors of or officials responsible for papers refuse to provide them or are willing to provide them only after certain portions have been removed. Public servants and ministers may sometimes invoke their obligations under certain legislation, such as the Privacy Act or the Access to Information Act, to justify their position (House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 3^rd ed., page 985).
49. As noted in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, these types of situations do not limit the power of committees to order the production of papers and records:
    

No statute or practice diminishes the fullness of that power rooted in House privileges unless there is an explicit legal provision to that effect, or unless the House adopts a specific resolution limiting the power. The House has never set a limit on its power to order the production of papers and records. (House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 3^rd ed. at page 985; see also Mr. Speaker Milliken’s rulings of April 27, 2010, Debates, pages 2039 to 2045, and March 9, 2011, Debates, pages 8840 to 8842, and Mr. Speaker Rota’s ruling on June 16, 2021, Debates, pages 8548 to 8550).

50. Similarly, as noted in Erskine May, 25^th ed., at paragraph 38.32, the same power to send for records is not considered subject to statutory exception in the United Kingdom House of Commons:
    

There is no restriction on the power of committees to require the production of papers by private bodies or individuals, provided that such papers are relevant to the committee’s work as defined by its order of reference. Select committees have formally ordered papers to be produced by the Chairman of a nationalised industry and a private society. Solicitors have been ordered to produce papers relating to a client; and a statutory regulator has been ordered to produce papers whose release was otherwise subject to statutory restriction.

51. In recent years, there was a very high-profile instance of the United Kingdom House of Commons insisting on the production of government legal opinions when, amidst the Brexit debates, on November 13, 2018, it adopted a motion requiring the production of
    

any legal advice in full, including that provided by the Attorney General, on the proposed withdrawal agreement on the terms of the UK’s departure from the European Union including the Northern Ireland backstop and framework for a future relationship between the UK and the European Union.

52. On December 3, 2018, the Attorney General of England and Wales presented to Parliament a Command Paper which purported to describe the “overall legal effect” of the EU withdrawal agreement of November 25, 2018. On the same day he made a statement to the House; neither the Command Paper nor the statement made reference to the resolution of November 13, 2018, and the Command Paper did not purport to be a return to the resolution of the House.
53. Later that day, after representatives of five opposition parties alleged the government had not produced the documents required, Mr. Speaker Bercow ruled that there was a prima facie contempt (Official Report, column 625). The House of Commons, on December 4, 2018, adopted the following motion:
    

That this House finds Ministers in contempt for their failure to comply with the requirements of the motion for return passed on 13 November 2018, to publish the final and full legal advice provided by the Attorney General to the Cabinet concerning the EU Withdrawal Agreement and the framework for the future relationship, and orders its immediate publication.

54. In response, the government produced a complete, unredacted copy of the Attorney General’s legal advice the next day. The Attorney General later said that he had complied with the order of the House of 4 December “out of respect of the House’s constitutional position.” (United Kingdom House of Commons Procedure Committee, “The House’s power to call for papers: procedure and practice” (2019), paragraph 68)
55. Your committee wishes to draw attention to what appears to be a possible breach of privilege, in relation to the production of legal opinion in response to its order of May 31, 2022, and recommends that the House take such measures as deemed necessary.
56. Further, your committee makes the following recommendation:
    That an Order do issue for all legal opinions which the government relied upon in determining that
    

    (a) the threshold of “threats to security of Canada”, as defined by section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, required by section 16 of the Emergencies Act, had been met;
    (b) the thresholds required by paragraphs 3(a) or (b) of the Emergencies Act, concerning a “national emergency” had been met; and
    (c) the situation could not “be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada”, as required by section 3 of the Emergencies Act,
    provided that
    (d) these documents shall be deposited with the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, in both official languages, within 14 days;
    (e) a copy of the documents shall also be deposited with the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, in both official languages, within 14 days, with any proposed redaction of information which, in the government’s opinion, could reasonably be expected to compromise national security;
    (f) the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel shall promptly thereafter notify the Speaker, who shall forthwith inform the Senate or the House, as the case may be, whether it is satisfied the requested documents were produced as ordered, provided that the Speaker shall, if the Senate or the House, as the case may be, stands adjourned, lay the opinion of the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel upon the Table pursuant to Senate Rule 14-1(6) or House Standing Order 32(1), as the case may be;
    (g) the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel shall transmit to the Public Order Emergency Commission a copy of the unredacted documents, referred to in paragraph (d), forthwith upon receipt;
    (h) the Speaker shall cause the documents, redacted under paragraph (e), to be laid upon the Table at the next earliest opportunity, and, after being tabled, they shall stand referred to the Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency;
    (i) representatives of the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel shall discuss with the committee, at an in camera meeting, to be held within one month of the redacted documents being tabled, whether it agrees with the redactions proposed by the government; and
    (j) the committee may, after hearing from the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, accept the proposed redactions, or reject some or all the proposed redactions and request the production of those unredacted documents in the manner to be determined by the Special Joint Committee;
    

    That the Clerk be directed to notify the Public Order Emergency Commission of the adoption of this Order; and

    That a message be sent to the other House to acquaint it accordingly.

57. A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings (Meetings Nos. XX) is tabled.

At 8:16 p.m., Mr. Green took the chair.

At 8:22 p.m., the Honourable Senator Boniface took the chair.

At 8:35 p.m., the committee suspended.

At 8:41 p.m., the committee resumed.

Jacob Wells made a statement and answered questions.

At 9:06 p.m., Mr. Green took the chair.

At 9:12 p.m., the Honourable Senator Boniface took the chair.

At 9:28 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the joint chairs.

ATTEST:

Miriam Burke

Mark Palmer

Joint Clerks of the Committee