DEDC Committee Report
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Supplementary Opinion of the New Democratic Party
The invocation of the Emergencies Act represented a pivotal moment in Canadian governance, testing the strength of our Rights and Freedoms as outlined in the Charter. It challenged us to examine critical issues like transparency, accountability, and the resilience of our democracy. As members of the New Democratic Party, we stand by the recommendations in the main report but believe that further reflection is essential. This reflection will help us address the broader implications of this moment and ensure we chart a future that protects the rights of Canadians.
New Democrats stress the urgent need to rebuild public confidence in our institutions. Achieving this will require a much deeper democratic commitment to parliamentary transparency and accountability—not just in the specific context of the Emergencies Act but in our ongoing governance efforts. The occupation’s events revealed a sobering truth: our democracy is more fragile than many of us may have understood. Restoring it fully will require sustained effort, extending far beyond the resolution of this immediate crisis.
During parliamentary debates, we raised fundamental questions about the government’s duty to uphold Charter rights. Specifically, we sought clarity on whether the rights guaranteed under the Charter remained intact, as suggested in the declaration’s preamble, or if the government intended to invoke section 1 of the Charter to justify potential breaches. These inquiries reflect a broader challenge: reconciling emergency measures with the core principles of democracy and justice.
We also share widespread concerns about the long-term consequences of expanding policing powers under emergency measures. History reminds us of repeated overreach and misuse of authority against legitimate political movements, including those led by Indigenous peoples, climate activists, and workers. The failures of local police services during the Freedom Convoy—where officers appeared compromised or even sympathetic to the occupiers—exposed systemic issues that must be addressed. Many Canadians felt abandoned during this crisis, and the resulting loss of public trust underscores the urgent need for structural reform.
It’s troubling that the last royal commission on policing in Canada occurred in 1962, as the challenges of public safety have evolved significantly since then. We call on the Minister of Public Safety to establish a new national commission on policing. This body should examine police mandates, budgets, and their alignment with public safety goals. Additionally, we urge the creation of a dedicated office to investigate radicalization within public security forces and the misuse of resources for undemocratic purposes.
This moment demands more than procedural fixes to the Emergencies Act. We must modernize it by adding clear definitions, robust thresholds, and stronger transparency measures. But the work doesn’t stop there. Addressing the structural flaws in governance and policing exposed by this crisis is equally critical. Restoring public trust will require not only legislative reform but also a renewed commitment to the foundational values of democracy, justice, and accountability. Parliament must reclaim its role as the guardian of these principles, ensuring that the rights of Canadians are protected and our institutions remain resilient.
In conclusion, while New Democrats support the main DEDC report and its recommendations, we believe four specific aspects emerging from our committee work warrant further attention. These elements are key to addressing the systemic issues at the heart of this crisis and ensuring we emerge stronger as a nation.
Structure of the committee
As the Emergencies Act had never been used, the committee had no previous example as to how to undertake its work, particularly in light of the fact that the Act contemplates the role of the committee in the context of the on-going emergency, not necessarily after the invocation of the act had been revoked. Therefore, the committee undertook a discussion to help frame the scope of our study, taking into consideration s. 62 of the Act, the order of reference from both the House and the Senate, as well as testimony from Philippe Hallée (Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, Senate), Phillippe Dufresne (Law Clerk and Parliamentary Council, House of Commons) and the Honourable Perrin Beatty, former Minister of National Defence and sponsor of the bill that created the Emergencies Act.
The key consideration was whether the committee had the ability to consider the factors that led to the invocation of the act or if it was restricted to a narrower consideration of the exercise of powers and the performance of duties of the government during the invocation of the act.
In his testimony, Mr. Hallée stated:
Accordingly, this committee is master of its own affairs, subject to any direction from the House and the Senate. It can determine what information may or may not be relevant and necessary to the task it has been assigned, and it can determine whether a given line of inquiry is or is not within the scope of its mandate. In other words, the committee is within its rights to determine, on its own, whether any given line of inquiry or piece of information is relevant and necessary to its work.[1]
Mr. Dufresne further added “while the committee may be able to deal with certain matters in a more specific manner, other matters may require a consideration of the broader context”[2].
Regarding the argument that s. 62(1) of the Act proscribed narrow parameters for the committee, Mr. Beatty said:
I do want to be clear about this. We anticipated that the primary role of the committee was going to be to provide continuing parliamentary oversight, throughout the time of the crisis, of how the government was using its authority. What we certainly did not preclude was the ability of the committee to look at whether or not the authority that the government had given itself was appropriate.[3]
Based on the testimony of the Senate and House of Commons Law Clerks and Mr. Beatty, we believe that the committee has the authority to review the conditions and the information used by the government in its decision to invoke the Emergencies Act and the committee should not be limited only to reviewing the actions taken pursuant to the declaration of emergency. This approach is important for helping our committee understand the necessity and proportionality of the actions taken by the government.
The committee has made several recommendations in the main report regarding the role of the parliamentary committee, concerning the striking of the committee, its role and mandate, as well as administration. We hope that these recommendations as well as the testimony received by the committee will be given full consideration in any future amendments to the Emergencies Act.
Access to information
The ability of any parliamentary committee to properly conduct its work will in large part be dependent on whether or not it has access to witnesses and information relevant to its study. Standing Order 108(1)(a) clearly denotes the committee’s power to send for persons, papers, and records. This power to send for documents is further outlined by Beauchesne as follows:
- (1) Committees may send for any papers that are relevant to their Orders of Reference.
- Within this restriction, it appears that the power of the committee to send for papers is unlimited.[4]
In order for the committee to understand whether the Emergency Measures Regulations and the Emergency Economic Measures enacted by the government were reasonable and proportionate in achieving the goal of ending the emergency, the committee needs to have a better understanding of the inputs that went into the government’s decision-making. For example, without knowing the extent of security concerns, detailed understanding of the economic impact of the occupation/blockades, or the unsuccessful measures that had already been taken at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels, it is difficult for the committee to determine the necessity or effectiveness of the measures brought in under the Emergencies Act.
Nevertheless, there were numerous instances where the committee was unable to obtain the documentation it requested. Ministers and government officials repeatedly invoked cabinet confidence and/or solicitor-client privilege as a rationale for not answering questions or providing documents.
Of particular concern was the refusal of the government to provide the legal opinion, referenced in witness testimony, that was used by the Cabinet to widen the interpretation of paragraph 2(c) of the Canada Security Intelligence Service Act, which sets the threshold for a threat to national security within the Emergencies Act.[5][6]This legal opinion was of critical importance in the deliberations of the Cabinet and would have provided invaluable insight to the reasonableness of the government’s determination that the threshold to declare an emergency was met.
The committee notes that the Public Order Emergency Commission was also refused access to many of these same documents.
Additionally, the refusal of the Premier of Ontario, Doug Ford, and then Solicitor-General of Ontario, Sylvia Jones, to accept the invitation to appear before our committee left significant gaps in the committee’s ability to fully understand the decisions and actions taken by the Ontario government to bring an end to the occupation in Ottawa and the blocking of international borders. Although Mr. Ford and Ms. Jones have the right to invoke parliamentary privilege, their refusal to participate in the public inquiry or to appear before our committee is a failure of leadership and further reinforces the criticism that the Ontario government did not take to Freedom Convoy occupation of Ottawa with the seriousness it deserved.
The use of extraordinary powers granted to the federal government by the Emergencies Act necessitates extraordinary candor and disclosure. It is not enough that we assume the government acted in good faith as David Lametti implied during his appearance before to Public Order Emergency Commission.[7] Therefore, we suggest the following:
Recommendation 1: That the Emergencies Act be amended to reflect the obligation of the federal government to provide to the parliamentary review committee all the inputs to Cabinet and to ministers on the issue, including all information, advice, and recommendations provided to Cabinet, Cabinet committees and individual ministers.
Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE)
A theme that was present throughout the Freedom Convoy and testimony raised at our committee is the increased threat posed by ideologically motivated violent extremism. From the very outset, extremist elements were present as part of the convoy movement, most prominently those behind a Memorandum of Understanding calling for the overthrow of the elected government.[8] The involvement of IMVE groups was further raised when right wing paraphernalia was found when police seized a weapons cache at the border blockade in Coutts, Alberta.
During testimony at our committee, then Canada Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director David Vigneault stated that:
In the case of the “freedom convoy”, CSIS was concerned by the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, and specifically the potential for serious acts of violence. As I recently said publicly, IMVE currently represents a significant national security threat. The combination of major disruptive events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media, and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an environment ripe for exploitation by influencers and extremists. This environment has the potential to inspire individuals to commit acts of violence.[9]
Concerns were also raised by Mr. Vigneault that the convoy would be used to spread right-wing propaganda and recruit like-minded people to their cause.
Despite the clear concern by CSIS and other intelligence services, a key intelligence report relied upon by the Ottawa Police Services failed to specifically identify IVME actors as a potential threat. Instead, it identified ISIS, “fringe” entities, and people who “get a sick thrill from just basically trolling the legitimate protesters” as key security concerns.[10] This would appear to be a significant lapse and further aspects of this intelligence analysis served to undermine the Ottawa Police Services preparation and response to the Freedom Convoy.
The growth of ideologically motivated violent extremism is a very real threat to public safety and national security. It has already been connected to the murder of people in London, ON and Quebec City, QC. Testimony from Marie-Hélène Chayer, Executive Director of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre stated that half of CSIS’s counter-terrorism resources are dedicated to investigating IMVE.[11]
There is also growing acknowledgment of IMVE infiltration into Canada’s military and police services. A report by the Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination highlighted the disturbing fact that white nationalist and extremists are present within the Canadian Armed Forces, and that membership in extremist groups is growing.[12] In 2021, then Minister of Public Safety also raised concerns that white supremacist and IMVE groups are actively recruiting members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.[13]
The risk of having active and former members of the Canadian military and police services is a clear and present threat to the safety and security of Canada. Therefore, we suggest the following: Recommendation 2: That the federal government strike an independent task force to investigate Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE) within policing services.
Policing
The aspect of the Freedom Convoy that has justifiably received the most amount of attention and criticism is the failures of policing. It was clear from the outset that the Ottawa Police Services was unprepared and misunderstood the threat that the Freedom Convoy posed in the City of Ottawa and that there were significant challenges posed by the multi-jurisdictional aspects of intelligence sharing and of policing in the nation’s capital.
Of deep concern was the fact that police operations and tactics were being leaked to protest organizers and leads to questions about how and who was leaking this information. Furthermore, many in the public were dismayed to see police officers refusing to enforce laws or being openly supportive of the Freedom Convoy. It was also revealed that members of Joint Task Force 2, members of the RCMP security detail for the Prime Minister, and other former military and police members were playing key roles in Freedom Convoy organizing and leadership.[14]
These factors further served to undermine the confidence that the public had in the ability of the police to control and end the occupation in Ottawa and at border crossings around the country.
Of the 56 recommendations made by the Public Order Emergency Commission, the first 27 recommendations are made regarding policing. Many of the recommendations call for changes to be made at all orders of policing with a particular emphasis on interoperability which speaks to the challenge of policing in a multi-jurisdictional structure.
While these recommendations have merit on their own, they form part of a larger body of reports calling for police reform in Canada. In recent years, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty have issued reports with significant recommendations on policing in Canada. There have also been increased discussion about the role of contract policing in Canada, expansion of the role of sheriff services in Alberta, and the move to replace the RCMP with a municipal police service in Surrey, B.C.
Therefore, in light of the deficiencies exposed in recent reports, the changing aspects of law enforcement, and a need to update approaches to community safety, we suggest the following:
Recommendation 3: That the federal government, in co-ordination with provincial, territorial and indigenous governments undertake a nation review of policing in Canada.
Conclusion
The Freedom Convoy, both in Ottawa and at sites across the country, saw a combination of factors that made this movement different than most other protests. The reach of social media and the speed at which information was circulated, the rapid influx of millions of dollars in donations, the sophisticated supply lines set up to maintain the Ottawa occupation, and a decentralized leadership placed significant challenges on police and government officials.
The failure of police in Ottawa to properly understand the threat posed by the Freedom Convoy allowed for protesters to entrench themselves and for the original weekend demonstration to become an unlawful demonstration and ultimately a three-week occupation. Testimony from police services made clear that during the occupation illegal acts were taking place daily, several weapons charges laid against protesters, and police had being swarmed when they tried to make arrests.[15] The inability of police to control and disperse the occupation in Ottawa, the numerous and potentially expanding blockades at border crossings throughout the country, and the significant seizure of weapons in Coutts, AB made clear that there was a national emergency.
The use of extraordinary measures, such as the Emergencies Act, can never be taken lightly and should only be considered as a tool of last resort. These powers must be used in a time limited fashion, proportional to the emergency it is addressing, and should be done with a maximum of transparency and accountability. It is incumbent on the government to provide the public with as much information as possible regarding its decision to invoke the Act in order for parliamentarians and the public to fully understand the full extent of the emergency, the full breadth of options available to the government, and to justify the measures put in place. Failing to provide this high level of transparency will increase cynicism and fuel conspiracy. It further undermines the ability for the government to fully be held to account for its actions, and the Liberal government deserves the criticism it has received for failing to provide critical documents and testimony to the parliamentary oversight committee and to the Public Order Emergency Commission.
The invocation of the Emergencies Act has revealed deep and systemic challenges in Canada’s governance, policing, and the protection of democratic rights. The issues of transparency, accountability, and public trust exposed during this crisis must be addressed with urgency and purpose. As New Democrats, we believe the recommendations in this report are a vital step forward, but they must be accompanied by broader reforms. Whether it is modernizing the Emergencies Act, investigating extremism within public institutions, or rethinking the role and structure of policing, Canada must seize this moment to rebuild its institutions in alignment with democratic values. Only through sustained effort and genuine accountability can we restore public confidence and ensure that our democracy remains resilient against future challenges.
[1] Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, Evidence No. 003, March 29, 2022, p. 2
[2] Ibid, p. 3
[3] Ibid p. 23
[4] Beauchesne. Arthur. Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada, (6th ed.)(Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1958), p. 236
[5] Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, Evidence No. 020, December 1, 2022, p. 2
[6] Testimony of David Lametti, Public Hearing of the Public Order Emergency Commission, vol. 29, p. 117.
[7] Testimony of David Lametti, Public Hearing of the Public Order Emergency Commission, vol. 29, p. 178
[8] https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/COM00000866.pdf
[9] Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, Evidence No. 007, May 10, 2022, p. 2
[10] https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPS00004039.pdf?t=1667279408
[11] Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, Evidence No. 020, December 1, 2022, p. 20
[12] MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ADVISORY PANEL ON SYSTEMIC RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION with a focus on Anti-Indigenous and Anti-Black Racism, LGBTQ2+ Prejudice, Gender Bias, and White Supremacy FINAL REPORT January 2022
[13] https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/public-safety-minister-acknowledges-threat-of-white-supremacist-infiltration-to-canada-s-police-forces/article_bfed5787-486e-5dae-83e2-9c7447920628.html
[14] Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, Evidence No. 020, December 1, 2022, p. 5
[15] Special Joint Committee on the Declaration of Emergency, Evidence No. 017, November 3, 2022.