Bill C-20
If you have any questions or comments regarding the accessibility of this publication, please contact us at accessible@parl.gc.ca.
|
|
48-49 ELIZABETH II |
|
|
|
CHAPTER 26 |
|
|
|
An Act to give effect to the requirement for
clarity as set out in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec
Secession Reference
|
|
|
|
[Assented to 29th June, 2000]
|
|
| Preamble
|
Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada has
confirmed that there is no right, under
international law or under the Constitution of
Canada, for the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec to effect
the secession of Quebec from Canada
unilaterally;
|
|
|
|
Whereas any proposal relating to the
break-up of a democratic state is a matter of
the utmost gravity and is of fundamental
importance to all of its citizens;
|
|
|
|
Whereas the government of any province
of Canada is entitled to consult its population
by referendum on any issue and is entitled to
formulate the wording of its referendum
question;
|
|
|
|
Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada has
determined that the result of a referendum on
the secession of a province from Canada must
be free of ambiguity both in terms of the
question asked and in terms of the support it
achieves if that result is to be taken as an
expression of the democratic will that would
give rise to an obligation to enter into
negotiations that might lead to secession;
|
|
|
|
Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada has
stated that democracy means more than
simple majority rule, that a clear majority in
favour of secession would be required to
create an obligation to negotiate secession,
and that a qualitative evaluation is required to
determine whether a clear majority in favour
of secession exists in the circumstances;
|
|
|
|
Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada has
confirmed that, in Canada, the secession of a
province, to be lawful, would require an
amendment to the Constitution of Canada,
that such an amendment would perforce
require negotiations in relation to secession
involving at least the governments of all of the
provinces and the Government of Canada, and
that those negotiations would be governed by
the principles of federalism, democracy,
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the
protection of minorities;
|
|
|
|
Whereas, in light of the finding by the
Supreme Court of Canada that it would be for
elected representatives to determine what
constitutes a clear question and what
constitutes a clear majority in a referendum
held in a province on secession, the House of
Commons, as the only political institution
elected to represent all Canadians, has an
important role in identifying what constitutes
a clear question and a clear majority sufficient
for the Government of Canada to enter into
negotiations in relation to the secession of a
province from Canada;
|
|
|
|
And Whereas it is incumbent on the
Government of Canada not to enter into
negotiations that might lead to the secession of
a province from Canada, and that could
consequently entail the termination of
citizenship and other rights that Canadian
citizens resident in the province enjoy as full
participants in Canada, unless the population
of that province has clearly expressed its
democratic will that the province secede from
Canada;
|
|
|
|
Now, Therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate and House of
Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
|
|
|
|
|
|
| House of
Commons to
consider
question
|
1. (1) The House of Commons shall, within
thirty days after the government of a province
tables in its legislative assembly or otherwise
officially releases the question that it intends
to submit to its voters in a referendum relating
to the proposed secession of the province from
Canada, consider the question and, by
resolution, set out its determination on
whether the question is clear.
|
|
| Extension of
time
|
(2) Where the thirty days referred to in
subsection (1) occur, in whole or in part,
during a general election of members to serve
in the House of Commons, the thirty days shall
be extended by an additional forty days.
|
|
| Considera- tions
|
(3) In considering the clarity of a
referendum question, the House of Commons
shall consider whether the question would
result in a clear expression of the will of the
population of a province on whether the
province should cease to be part of Canada and
become an independent state.
|
|
| Where no
clear
expression of
will
|
(4) For the purpose of subsection (3), a clear
expression of the will of the population of a
province that the province cease to be part of
Canada could not result from
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Other views to
be considered
|
(5) In considering the clarity of a
referendum question, the House of Commons
shall take into account the views of all
political parties represented in the legislative
assembly of the province whose government
is proposing the referendum on secession, any
formal statements or resolutions by the
government or legislative assembly of any
province or territory of Canada, any formal
statements or resolutions by the Senate, any
formal statements or resolutions by the
representatives of the Aboriginal peoples of
Canada, especially those in the province
whose government is proposing the
referendum on secession, and any other views
it considers to be relevant.
|
|
| No
negotiations if
question not
clear
|
(6) The Government of Canada shall not
enter into negotiations on the terms on which
a province might cease to be part of Canada if
the House of Commons determines, pursuant
to this section, that a referendum question is
not clear and, for that reason, would not result
in a clear expression of the will of the
population of that province on whether the
province should cease to be part of Canada.
|
|
| House of
Commons to
consider
whether there
is a clear will
to secede
|
2. (1) Where the government of a province,
following a referendum relating to the
secession of the province from Canada, seeks
to enter into negotiations on the terms on
which that province might cease to be part of
Canada, the House of Commons shall, except
where it has determined pursuant to section 1
that a referendum question is not clear,
consider and, by resolution, set out its
determination on whether, in the
circumstances, there has been a clear
expression of a will by a clear majority of the
population of that province that the province
cease to be part of Canada.
|
|
| Factors for
House of
Commons to
take into
account
|
(2) In considering whether there has been a
clear expression of a will by a clear majority
of the population of a province that the
province cease to be part of Canada, the House
of Commons shall take into account
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Other views to
be considered
|
(3) In considering whether there has been a
clear expression of a will by a clear majority
of the population of a province that the
province cease to be part of Canada, the House
of Commons shall take into account the views
of all political parties represented in the
legislative assembly of the province whose
government proposed the referendum on
secession, any formal statements or
resolutions by the government or legislative
assembly of any province or territory of
Canada, any formal statements or resolutions
by the Senate, any formal statements or
resolutions by the representatives of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada, especially
those in the province whose government
proposed the referendum on secession, and
any other views it considers to be relevant.
|
|
| No
negotiations
unless will
clear
|
(4) The Government of Canada shall not
enter into negotiations on the terms on which
a province might cease to be part of Canada
unless the House of Commons determines,
pursuant to this section, that there has been a
clear expression of a will by a clear majority
of the population of that province that the
province cease to be part of Canada.
|
|
| Constitu- tional amendments
|
3. (1) It is recognized that there is no right
under the Constitution of Canada to effect the
secession of a province from Canada
unilaterally and that, therefore, an amendment
to the Constitution of Canada would be
required for any province to secede from
Canada, which in turn would require
negotiations involving at least the
governments of all of the provinces and the
Government of Canada.
|
|
| Limitation
|
(2) No Minister of the Crown shall propose
a constitutional amendment to effect the
secession of a province from Canada unless
the Government of Canada has addressed, in
its negotiations, the terms of secession that are
relevant in the circumstances, including the
division of assets and liabilities, any changes
to the borders of the province, the rights,
interests and territorial claims of the
Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the
protection of minority rights.
|
|