REGS Committee Meeting
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THE STANDING JOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE SCRUTINY OF REGULATIONS
OTTAWA, Monday, June 13, 2022
The Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations met with videoconference this day at 11 a.m. [ET] for the review of Statutory Instruments.
Mr. Blake Richards and Senator Yuen Pau Woo (Joint Chairs) in the chair.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): We are a few minutes behind. We had a couple of issues we were trying to resolve. I think they’ve been resolved, and we have most members with us virtually and a few in the room with us today. We’ll do our best to manage that. We’ve all learned enough in the last couple of years that I’m sure we can.
Without further ado, we’ll jump into the agenda.
SOR/2002-421 — CANADIAN FORCES EMPLOYMENT EQUITY REGULATIONS
(For text of documents, see Appendix A, p. 5A:1.)
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): We’ve seen this before the committee a number of times. I believe Mr. Abel is doing the presenting on this, so we’ll turn to you to take the floor on this.
Shawn Abel, Counsel to the Committee: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Happily, there is not much to say on this file. Two amendments have been outstanding for many years. The joint chairs wrote to the minister in 2019 in order to expedite these matters. Amendments that address the committee’s concerns were made last year by SOR/2021-201. Those regulations will be placed before the committee in the future. This file can be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Are there any comments on that? Is there agreement with the recommendation? Not seeing any comments, I will assume there is agreement. I see at least one thumbs up, and we’ll take that as agreement.
We’ll move on then. The next four items on our agenda are under New Instruments. Mr. Abel, I believe you’re presenting all four of these next items, but we’ll turn to you for this item and go from there.
INTERIM ORDERS RESPECTING THE USE OF MODEL AIRCRAFT (U2017-1)
(For text of documents, see Appendix B, p. 5B:1.)
Mr. Abel: Thank you. Members will likely have noticed that the batch of four files on the agenda today all relate to interim orders made under the Aeronautics Act. All of these files relate in part to a common question regarding the questionable validity of consecutive orders made on the same subject. However, there are individual concerns on each file to be discussed as well. I ask members to bear with me as there is quite a lot to cover on these files.
Beginning with the oldest set of orders, this file contains a series of nine interim orders governing the use of model aircraft, including remotely piloted drones.
The committee has, on previous occasions, dealt with the making of consecutive interim orders under this act. Members may recall that the committee reviewed two sets of such orders at its meeting of May 2. As a reminder, the interim order regime under the act functions as follows.
Pursuant to section 6.41 of the act, an interim order may contain any provision that could be enacted in a regulation under the act. The act provides for a clear process in which an interim order may remain in force for up to 14 days. Within that maximum period, the order may be approved by the Governor-in-Council for up to a year. Following approval by the Governor-in-Council, the minister is required to recommend, as soon as possible, that the measures contained in that order be adopted in a regulation. The approved order ceases to have effect either when a regulation containing the same measures is made or when the order expires at the end of one year.
The committee has, on several occasions, encountered sets of consecutive interim orders made on the same subject, as is the case here. The committee has considered that Parliament did not intend for this practice to be authorized but, rather, expressed a clear intention that the process set out in section 6.41 of the act be followed.
In connection with SI/2016-16, another file involving consecutive interim orders, the joint chairs wrote to the Minister of Transport on March 9, 2017, to express the committee’s frustration with the practice of making consecutive interim orders. The minister responded on June 2, 2017. While the minister’s letter indicated that no more consecutive orders would be made on that file, it did not respond directly to the committee’s concern regarding the general practice of making consecutive orders. However, a noticeable shift in that practice was observable following the receipt of the minister’s letter, and that shift in practice continued up until the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic and was observed on both this file and the next file under item 3 in the agenda.
Therefore, to turn to these specific orders, eight consecutive interim orders were made concerning model aircraft, beginning on March 13, 2017, and being made approximately every two weeks. Order No. 8 was approved by the Governor-in-Council on June 20, 2017. Members may notice that this approval came shortly after the minister’s letter was received by the committee.
We then move to March 7, 2018, about nine months after the approval of Order No. 8. At that time, counsel wrote to the department, raising several issues, including that the committee already considered the making of consecutive interim orders to be unauthorized. At that time, proposed regulatory amendments, which would add substantially the same content as Order No. 8, had already been prepublished in Part I of the Canada Gazette. In fact, this prepublication had been done only a mere month after the approval of Order No. 8.
This all seemed very encouraging, and counsel asked the department to confirm that no further interim orders in this series would be made. However, no response was received. Instead, on May 31, 2018, Interim Order No. 9 was enacted. That was shortly before Order No. 8 was set to expire at the end of its one-year period. Order No. 9 was then quickly approved again by the Governor-in-Council for up to a year.
Ultimately, regulations were enacted on January 9, 2019, replacing Order No. 9 some seven months after it had been made.
Counsel corresponded with the department a second time, after Order No. 9 had been approved. The department’s reply of September 20, 2018, sought to explain the making of consecutive orders by emphasizing the “extraordinary circumstances that warranted immediate measures” to address a rapid growth in the number of incidents involving model aircraft.
Counsel never questioned, however, the need to take immediate measures. Indeed, it seems self-evident that the power to quickly enact interim orders is provided precisely for that reason.
The department’s letter asserted without explanation that it was necessary to continue to respond via consecutive interim orders. The department did not explain why approval had not been sought until the eighth order, although it may be worth noting again that approval came just after the joint chairs had written to the minister on another file.
Regarding the making of the second approved order, which is Order No. 9, the department’s letter stated that the minister made that order to ensure that there was no gap with the coming into force of the new regulations and that the department was working to complete the new regulations as quickly as possible. It was noted that a large number of written submissions were made in response to the prepublication of the proposed regulations. Presumably, the level of public feedback was higher than expected, which contributed to delays in failing to enact regulations before Order No. 8 would have expired.
In any event, the department seems to suggest that its inability to enact regulations before Order No. 8 would have expired was a sufficient reason to justify the making of yet another interim order and then another approved order. While the department’s explanation may reflect a practical reality, this approach may nonetheless have still been invalid given that it does not seem to conform to the process that Parliament intended.
At this point, I should note that more recent developments will be covered on items 4 and 5 of the agenda concerning interim orders responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those developments may lead to a reconsideration of the committee’s position regarding the authority to make consecutive orders. However, any such reconsideration will almost certainly be limited to circumstances that do not apply here, prior to the advent of the pandemic. I make this note just for members’ benefit before I conclude on this file.
To summarize, the minister enacted a series of eight consecutive interim orders. The committee has previously considered that this approach is unauthorized, and the department, in this case, has not provided any explanation that would seem to justify this approach or alter the committee’s prior view. Once the joint chairs wrote to the minister concerning this practice on another file and the minister’s reply was received, this approach seemed to end. A shift was made to seeking immediate approval of the interim order and, on this file, proposed regulatory amendments were also prepared very quickly. This seems to be an improvement and a good-faith effort to respond to the committee’s concerns.
However, the department evidently had difficulty completing its planned regulatory amendments within the one-year time frame provided for in the act. To make up for this inability, a second interim order was enacted and approved. Regulatory amendments that replaced Order No. 9 were finally made some seven months after that approval. In all, it took the department 19 months to prepare and enact regulations after the first approval of an interim order.
It still seems quite clear that the making of consecutive approved orders pursuant to section 6.41 of the act was not intended by Parliament. While the department has demonstrated efforts to address the committee’s concerns, these efforts have still resulted in an apparent circumvention of Parliament’s intent, albeit one that is perhaps less egregious than in the past.
It bears consideration that the reason given by the department for making the second approved order simply amounts to a practical inability to enact replacement regulations within the required time frame. It seems foreseeable that similar circumstances may arise again; indeed, the same pattern does take place on the next file.
As such, perhaps the department should be asked to consider whether the enabling authority provided in section 6.41 of the act remains appropriate or whether changes to the time frames provided in that section ought to be proposed to Parliament. For example, section 27.6 of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, which provides a substantially similar power, allows for a two-year period before an order approved by the Governor-in-Council ceases to have effect.
In any case, any further letter to the department should at least convey that the making of consecutive approved orders appears to be no more valid than the making of consecutive interim orders.
I do have further issues to address on this file, but members may wish to discuss this matter before I move on.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Thank you, Mr. Abel.
Is there any discussion or commentary that anyone wishes to offer at this point?
Mr. Garon: This seems to me to be a substantive file, among all the files we have examined since the committee resumed sitting.
I have read the first four items on the agenda. It seems that the law is quite clear, i.e., that we start with a two-week decree which can later, with the approval of cabinet, be extended to one year.
The spirit of the law is that people in civil society and industry should be able to evolve without facing arbitrariness and to operate in the long term in a predictable regulatory context. This is extremely important.
I understand one thing. Firstly, to turn temporary decrees into regulations takes a long time, more than 12 months, without necessarily having any gaps in time.
In fact, I would like to ask legal advisers the following question. If it is against the will of Parliament to operate by successive decrees in this way, how is it that the government has not yet, in its legislative program, proposed an amendment to the law to provide for two years, for example, as in the example you have given?
The second element is this: It seems to me that the committee’s recommendations are not taken seriously by the ministers, repeatedly. I understand that there are small advances left and right, but we end up with situations where the committee makes it very clear to the department and the minister that the will of Parliament is being violated by proceeding with consecutive orders-in-council. This has happened in four cases, and it is not related to the pandemic. And there is a second, third and fourth case. Then we have a small step forward, a small letter and a longer decree. Then a fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth time.
The first question is this: Why is it not part of the government’s legislative agenda to extend the period to two years for the order-in-council on Governor-in-Council approval? Secondly, is this a situation where the minister and the department were mocking the committee and not taking it seriously?
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Thank you, Mr. Garon.
Mr. Abel, I’m not sure if those are questions you feel you can address or not. Would you like to address those?
Mr. Abel: I can provide a little bit of an answer, if I may reply in English.
As for the first question about legislative policy, of course, I can’t speak to why the government makes the policy decisions it does or why it has not addressed this sooner. I know the committee has not recommended changes to this interim order scheme before.
In the past, the committee has always dealt with consecutive interim orders, the 14-day orders, and this is the first time it’s been confronted with a situation where the departments have attempted to make regulatory changes in line with the act but have failed for what seems to be practical reasons.
We’ve tried to devise a response that may provide a solution to this problem. It doesn’t appear that the department intended to violate either the act or Parliament’s intent for the act, but nonetheless, perhaps a solution can be found.
As for the way files tend to move through the committee, you’re correct. This is the way business works with the committee in general. I’ve been with the committee for a long time, and while the committee often does not have the power — except for in the case of disallowances — to force the hand of the Governor-in-Council or departments, it does have the power of persistence. Over time, the committee’s persistence does get results. It just requires quite a bit of repetition and patience.
The Joint Chair (Senator Woo): The question of why the government hasn’t proposed to or moved forward on changing the legislative timeline to two years is an issue that we, as Mr. Abel has pointed out, haven’t actually flagged as a possibility. If we were to do that — and it’s not a bad idea — it would be, from my understanding, a new direction we would be taking in the treatment of this file.
I don’t think it’s a bad idea, in the sense that when we find inconsistencies in the application of the regulations vis-à-vis the legislation, we tend to find fault with the application of the regulations and why they don’t correspond to the legislation. However, it could well be that the legislation was not done properly in the first place. As parliamentarians, we just didn’t think through what the right time frame was and so on.
If it is the will of this committee, I would be open to opening the possibility that the government consider changing the timeline for the making of regulations so that it’s a more realistic time frame for the officials to follow through on what would be the new intent of this legislation.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): We have a suggestion on the floor from Senator Woo. Mr. Garon, I saw your hand go up as he was making that suggestion. Are your comments related to that suggestion?
Mr. Garon: Yes, absolutely; that’s kind of the continuation of my thinking. Obviously, the minister is violating the will of Parliament, but far be it from me to say that he is doing it voluntarily.
It seems clear to me that these regulations seem appropriate and fair. Moreover, the public is entitled to a predictable regulatory framework. As Senator Woo says, it is very clear to me that there is a profound mismatch between the legislation, which gives the minister and the department too little time to prepare their regulations, and the reality on the ground.
I think we should, as a committee, in order to avoid wasting time and in order to avoid having this come back to us again and again from Transport Canada for technical reasons, make this suggestion to the minister; that is, to bring to his legislative agenda this idea of giving more time to the department, if only to allow the people in the field, to whom these regulations apply, to know that the minister has two years and that this becomes predictable.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Thank you, Mr. Garon and Senator Woo, for the suggestion. It seems as though the two of you certainly agree that would be a good direction moving forward. Is there anyone else who wants to comment on that suggestion? I don’t see any comments. Mr. Abel, is that something that we could undertake?
Mr. Abel: Yes, I think so. I have enough direction to draft a further letter.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Perfect. Let’s go ahead and do so, then. We’ll move to the next item on the agenda.
Mr. Abel: Before we do, Mr. Chair, there are still more issues on this file.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): My apologies. If you do have something further on this file, please go ahead.
Mr. Abel: Thank you. Turning to item 2, as discussed in the note, counsel’s initial letter sought to confirm dates in which some of the interim orders were tabled in either house of Parliament or transmitted to the clerk of either house, as the case may be. The act requires this be done within 15 days of each order being made. The department confirmed the necessary dates, and the act was complied with in every case.
Items 3, 4 and 6 through 9 of counsel’s letter raised issues regarding the drafting of certain provisions. This included drafting errors, as well as more substantive concerns about how the provisions would function. Some of these matters were either addressed in Order No. 9 or in the replacement regulations that were enacted. Others were rendered moot with the enactment of the regulations and do not need to be pursued.
This leaves item 5, which is addressed in the analysis portion of the note. This concerns a prohibition against the operation of model aircraft over or within “a security perimeter of a police or first responder emergency operations site.” The orders did not provide any definition or additional information to clarify what amounts to a security perimeter. The wording implies that it is a special zone within a larger emergency operations site.
The department’s letter of September 20, 2018, replied that a security perimeter may or may not have a physical demarcation. Given the unpredictable and variable nature of situations that trigger the creation of these perimeters, the department offered that there is an expectation that model aircraft pilots not fly over a site or hover within the established security perimeter. The question is: How will those pilots identify that perimeter? It was also suggested that the separate requirement that having an operator keep their model aircraft within their line of sight would allow such a perimeter to be identifiable.
The department stressed the possibility of grave consequences arising from the unsafe operation of model aircraft around a rescue area and cites apparent incidents where model aircraft have interfered with the takeoff of a medical helicopter and delayed fire response efforts. However, it does bear mentioning that such incidents would also have clearly contravened other prohibitions in the interim orders, and as such, they would have been unlawful anyway.
While it is obvious that the use of model aircraft should be restricted, at least to some degree, around emergency areas, the confusion here arises from the fact that the prohibition only applies within a security perimeter and not the larger emergency operations site. The department may be correct that it is not possible to more precisely describe the nature of a security perimeter. This is given the variable and unpredictable circumstances arising from a wide variety of emergency situations that might arise across the entire country. Nonetheless, the contravention of this prohibition amounts to an offence for which a penal sanction may be levied. It is therefore essential that the precise nature be reasonably clear to citizens so as to not unduly put persons at risk of inadvertently committing an offence. This provision has been carried on in a substantially similar form in section 901.12 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations, as enacted by SOR/2019-11.
Although the department states that it would be impossible to clarify the meaning of the term “security perimeter,” perhaps it would be possible to qualify this prohibition in some other manner that could provide a greater degree of certainty. For example, perhaps the prohibition should only apply where a physical demarcation does exist or only following a warning given by a first responder. If that is not feasible, perhaps the prohibition should be expanded to encompass an entire emergency site; or perhaps the prohibition should be contingent upon presenting a hazard or a risk of danger from the operation of a model aircraft as many other prohibitions in the Canadian Aviation Regulations already do — not necessarily in relation to model aircraft but, in general, relating to things that may cause a hazard or danger to aviation.
If members wish, these further questions or suggestions could be put to the department as part of the review of the replacement regulations. I would ask if that would be acceptable to the committee.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Thank you. Are there any comments on that or do we agree with the suggestion Mr. Abel is making?
We’re seeing agreement there, so you can proceed as you have outlined. Is that all on that item, then?
Mr. Abel: There is also item 9, which is the final item. This relates to a provision that requires the name, address and telephone number of the owner of a model aircraft to be clearly made visible on the aircraft.
The department’s reply agreed with counsel’s initial letter that this requirement is subjective. The department committed to further considering this issue in the development of the regulations. However, section 901.03 of the regulations sets out essentially the same requirement — that the registration number issued under the regulations is clearly visible on the aircraft. This does not seem to do away with any vagueness or subjectivity. If members agree, this matter will be pursued in the review of the replacement regulations.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Do we agree? We do, so that concludes that item. You can proceed as planned.
INTERIM ORDER(S) RESPECTING BATTERY-POWERED HAND-HELD LASERS (U2018-3)
(For text of documents, see Appendix C, p. 5C:1.)
Mr. Abel: This is the second file dealing with consecutive orders made prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The circumstances are quite similar to the previous file. Note that the events on this file all take place in the year after the joint chairs and the minister exchanged correspondence regarding the making of consecutive interim orders. The practice here reflects the shift that took place after those letters.
The first interim order in this series was made on June 28, 2018, which was then approved by the Governor-in-Council. Shortly before the first approved order would have expired, it was replaced by Order No. 2, on June 10, 2019. Order No. 2 was also approved three days later.
Finally, on June 10, 2020, exactly one year after Order No. 2 had been made, replacement regulations came into force. In February 2020, when Order No. 2 was still in effect, counsel put several questions to the department. Questions 1a to 1d under item 1 of the correspondence and the note relate to the practice of making consecutive approved orders.
Question 1a, in this case, asked the department to explain why Order No. 2 had been made at all rather than to be allowed to expire or to be replaced by regulations. The department’s reply is largely concerned with justifying the urgency or the need for measures to control laser attacks on aircraft, but, once again, counsel did not question the need for these measures to exist in some form. Later in the department’s letter, under heading 1(c)(ii), a more salient explanation is offered. It states that the department at first:
. . . envisioned that a regulation would immediately follow the first Interim Order, however, it was determined that a period of gathering statistics, data and analysis and further consultation with the aviation industry and other federal departments was required.
Evidently, that period of work took nearly two years. Nothing in the department’s response demonstrates a turbulent or evolving situation that would have made it impossible or inadvisable to enact regulatory enactments before the expiry of the first approved order. Indeed, there were no substantive changes between the first and second orders. In addition, although it has not been fully reviewed, the replacement regulations put into place by SOR/2020-124 appear to be substantially similar to these orders.
Given that the department’s consultation and research process took nearly two years, it might be asked why it was not possible to simply incorporate the content of the first order into the regulations and then make any further regulatory amendments, if necessary, a year or two later. The effect on the regulated public would have been the same. The major difference is that this approach allowed the department, in the words of the joint chairs’ letter of March 2017, to use the interim order process as “a substitute for regulations or to avoid the rigours of the regulatory process.”
While this may have saved some time and energy on the department’s part from having to go through the regulatory process twice, this is precisely the sort of practice the committee condemned as contrary to Parliament’s intent. Thus, the validity of Order No. 2 was highly questionable.
As in the prior file, it seems foreseeable that these circumstances will arise again. Perhaps the same suggestion can be made to the department in respect of both of these files that consideration needs to be given to the adequacy of the interim order process as currently set out in the act.
If members agree, the letter that goes to the department can refer to both of those files.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is there agreement? Or is there any commentary or discussion? We have agreement. You can proceed as outlined. Is that all for this file?
Mr. Abel: There are some more issues, I’m afraid.
Questions 1b and 1c relate to the requirements under subsection 6.41(3) of the act that the minister recommend to the Governor-in-Council, as soon as possible after the approval of an interim order, the making of a replacement regulation for that approved order.
According to the department, a recommendation was made by the minister on May 30, 2020. In respect of the first order, it is therefore certain that the minister did not carry out this requirement. Even with respect to Order No. 2, the minister apparently made a recommendation nearly 12 months after that order had been approved. At best, this stretches the requirement to make such a recommendation as soon as possible to its utmost limit. The act does not provide for any legal consequence to flow from a failure to follow this requirement. However, the existence of this requirement amounts to further statutory evidence that Parliament did not intend for another interim order to be made following the approval of a first order.
Question 1d sought confirmation that Order No. 2 would at least be replaced with a regulation prior to the end of its one-year term. As mentioned earlier, this was done when the Canadian Aviation Regulations were amended by SOR/2020-124.
Moving on to item 2, this dealt with requirements under the act that interim orders be tabled in Parliament. The department confirmed that this requirement was met for both orders.
Item No. 3 deals with subsection 4(1) of these orders. This provision prohibits the possession of hand-held lasers of a power output of greater than 1 milliwatt — which is to say laser pointers — within the municipalities of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, as well as within 10 kilometres of any airport or heliport, subject to certain exceptions.
While there are exceptions that allow possession for specifically listed purposes, or as long as the device remains inside a dwelling house, the scope of this prohibition nonetheless extends well beyond physical locations normally associated with aviation and may have a significant and unexpected impact on the rights and liberties of individuals. The department was therefore asked to identify the precise enabling power for this prohibition.
The department contends that this prohibition is validly authorized by a combination of two enabling powers. First is the general power found in the chapeau to section 4.9 of the act, which authorizes the making of regulations “respecting aeronautics,” and second, paragraph 4.9(m), which authorizes “the prohibition of the doing of any other act or thing in respect of which regulations . . . may be made.”
As a reminder, an interim order may contain the same provisions that may be enacted in a regulation. As a starting principle, a mere general power to make regulations respecting aeronautics is not likely sufficient, on its own, to authorize such prohibition. A general power to make regulations in respect of a subject matter is, of course, not without inherent limits. The greater or more unusual the deprivation of liberty involved or the farther removed the measure is from the core subject matter, the less likely it is to be authorized in the absence of a specific or express power.
In this case, a blanket prohibition on the possession of an ordinary recreational item — an item likely to be in the possession of a significant number of individuals, particularly those with pets, and covering the three largest cities in Canada as well as a 20-kilometre diameter around every airport and heliport in the country — amounts to a fairly significant imposition into the private lives of citizens and does so in a manner that is perhaps tenuously connected to aviation. This is particularly so if one presumes that the majority of hand-held laser pointers will likely never be used in a manner that would affect aviation. In contrast, a prohibition on the use or operation of hand-held lasers in a way that can reasonably be expected to cause a danger to aviation would have a more direct connection to aviation safety and might therefore be seen as more closely related to aeronautics.
It follows that a general power to make regulations respecting aeronautics is itself insufficient to authorize subsection 4.1 of these interim orders. With respect to paragraph 4.9(m) of the act, once again this provision authorizes the making of regulations, including “the prohibition of the doing of any other act or thing in respect of which regulations . . . may be made.” This power does not seem relevant. It specifically authorizes a prohibition on doing an act or thing. It simply does not speak to the mere possession of an object.
Although not discussed by the department, counsel’s initial letter cited what appears to be the most relevant enabling authority. Paragraph 4.9(o) of the act permits the “use and operation of any objects that in the opinion of the Minister are likely to be hazardous to aviation safety . . . .”
As can be seen from its wording, even this provision is limited to authorizing rules regarding the use and operation of objects and not their mere possession.
In sum, there simply does not appear to be sufficient authority present in the act to enact prohibitions on the possession of objects or property not directly connected to aviation. It follows that subsection 4.1 of these orders was ultra vires. Although these interim orders have now been repealed, a similar prohibition has been added in section 601.19 of the regulations, to which the same analysis would apply. Hence, the committee’s views on this matter will be applied when counsel reviews the replacement regulations.
Would members like to pause here to discuss, or should I continue to the last item?
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is there any discussion? You can continue to the last item.
Mr. Abel: This would be under item 4.
Counsel notified the department of an apparent oversight in these orders, in which a person was allowed to possess a hand-held laser within a dwelling house, but no allowance was made for transporting said lasers to or from dwelling houses. This oversight was corrected when the replacement regulations were put into place.
In conclusion, there are two matters outstanding. The first is the making of the consecutive approved orders. This is a common issue with the last file and thus the letter that is to be sent on that file could also make reference to these issues and draw upon the specific points that were mentioned here. In respect of the other issue concerning the validity of the prohibition on possessing a hand-held laser, counsel will apply this analysis in reviewing the replacement regulations.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Do we have agreement on those two recommendations?
We’ll add these issues to the first letter and the second recommendation. It looks like there are several thumbs up. I think you can proceed. That’s all for item 3 on our agenda?
Mr. Abel: That’s all.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): You have item 4 as well.
INTERIM ORDER(S) TO PREVENT CERTAIN PERSONS FROM BOARDING FLIGHTS TO CANADA DUE TO COVID-19, NOS. 1-10 (U2020-2)
(For text of documents, see Appendix D, p. 5D:1.)
Mr. Abel: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I’m speaking on U2020-2, which is our own file name convention. This is the first file before the committee dealing with interim orders made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
On March 17, 2020, the minister began to enact interim orders under the Aeronautics Act in response to the pandemic, and 10 orders were made in this series, which applied to flights originating outside of Canada. These orders imposed various measures, including: restrictions on the ability of passengers to board flights to Canada; requirements on flight operators to screen passengers, monitor passengers and report incidents to the minister; and requirements on passengers to answer specified questions — and later, also, requirements to wear face masks. The precise provisions contained in each order varied over time in response to the evolving situation as well as to comments from committee counsel. In June 2020, the tenth order was replaced by an interim order in a new series, which has been dealt with in a separate file and will be brought before the committee at a later date.
As members are aware, the committee has previously considered the making of consecutive orders under the act to not be authorized. In 2017, the joint chairs and the minister exchanged correspondence regarding this practice. Following that exchange, the making of consecutive interim orders ceased, although consecutive approved orders were still made. The advent of the pandemic saw a return to the making of consecutive interim orders. All 10 of these orders were interim orders, which is to say they were in effect up to 14 days and none of them were approved by the Governor-in-Council. This practice forms part of a pattern observed in connection with many interim orders made under the Aeronautics Act and under other acts in response to the pandemic.
Shortly after the pandemic erupted in Canada, committee counsel began to review these orders as they were being published and provided comments to the department. Counsel did not, however, convey new objections to the practice of making consecutive interim orders. It had become immediately apparent that it would be necessary for the committee to examine the novel circumstances of the pandemic to determine whether this gives rise to a new or expanded understanding of the scope of authority provided in section 6.41 of the act.
It is trite to say that the COVID-19 pandemic amounted to a national emergency. Especially in the early months, the pertinent facts and medical science regarding the disease and the necessary and appropriate policy responses were evolving on a daily or weekly basis. These early months were also, as everyone recalls, an extraordinarily chaotic time overall. This was reflected in the substantial changes that took place from order to order in this series. For example, over the span of 10 orders, modifications were made to the classes of air transport to which the orders applied; the classes of foreign nationals who were prohibited from boarding — and this reflected ongoing changes to orders made under the Quarantine Act; the requirements regarding face masks, which were introduced in Order No. 6; and the classes of persons exempt from various requirements. In addition, Orders No. 4, 7 and 9 incorporated changes addressing concerns raised by committee counsel. While only some of these provisions were changed or added from order to order, it may overall be said that these orders were responding to a highly volatile situation in which it was not clear how long any given measure imposed by order would be necessary, sufficient or appropriate.
The COVID-19 pandemic is categorically different from prior occasions when the minister has made use of interim orders under the act. Even in cases where the minister had identified an urgent need to respond to a problem, such as the dangers of model aircraft or hand-held lasers, these problems were discrete and straightforward — a rising trend in a specific type of activity that required prevention or control. The nature of the dangerous activity in question was not difficult to grasp and remained the same over time.
It bears noting that the wording of section 6.41 of the act does not expressly prohibit the making of consecutive interim orders. The committee has considered that this cannot on its own be taken to mean that consecutive orders are authorized. Parliament should not be expected to expressly foreclose a practice that it may not have anticipated. What is clear is that Parliament set out a process that it expected to be followed. However, since the making of consecutive orders is not expressly prohibited, it is possible that doing so might be found to be authorized if the circumstances were such that neither the wording of the act nor the intent of Parliament were contravened.
If this may be so, there must be some principled limit to the use of consecutive interim orders, precisely for the reason previously identified by the committee, which is that the use of multiple orders is effectively a means to avoid the rigours and safeguards of the regulatory process.
In all the prior circumstances observed by the committee in which the minister has made multiple interim orders, no reason was apparent that would justify the making of consecutive orders. In every case, it would have been possible to seek the approval of the first interim order and then proceed to a regulatory enactment.
The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has demonstrated a reason for which it may be truly necessary to enact consecutive interim orders in order to respond to a “significant risk” or an immediate threat to the safety of the public, the passengers and the crew members. Put simply, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine how the risks plainly evident to the passengers, crew members and the public as a result of air travel could have been managed in the early months of the pandemic without resort to consecutive interim orders.
Consequently, the committee should consider incorporating an additional principle into its interpretation of section 6.41 of the act. This principle may be stated as follows:
. . . the making of consecutive interim orders pursuant to section 6.41 of the Act may be authorized in circumstances where the risk or threat giving rise to the orders is so volatile or uncertain as to render it impossible to establish a fixed set of provisions to respond to that situation, or where it is necessary to urgently make substantive changes to an existing order.
Recognizing an exception on this basis would not alter the committee’s prior findings with respect to other sets of interim orders made by the minister under the act. However, this exception may be applicable to other sets of orders made during this pandemic as well as in the event of another serious disease outbreak or some other highly volatile and uncertain situation affecting aviation.
In addition, if this interpretation is adopted by the committee, it should be made clear to the minister that the recognition of such an exception is not open-ended and would be construed strictly and narrowly. It is the volatility and uncertainty of the factual situation that would justify the making of consecutive orders.
Once the underlying situation becomes sufficiently clear such that the necessary measures in response can be established with some certainty, the minister should not continue to make consecutive interim orders and would have to seek approval of the latest order by the Governor-in-Council. From that point forward, during the period between approval and a replacement regulatory enactment, the making of a further order on the same subject would only be justified where a substantive change was necessary and urgent. Otherwise, any desired changes could be incorporated into the forthcoming regulatory enactment.
This suggestion for a new or expanded understanding of the authority granted under section 6.41 of the act is a significant addition to the position the committee has taken in the past. Therefore, I will pause here to allow members to discuss this before moving on to a few other minor matters on this file.
The Joint Chair (Senator Woo): Thank you, Mr. Abel. This proposed new principle that you are offering would make it more difficult for any repetitive interim orders that do not meet the criteria, so I think that’s very positive.
But the way you framed the criteria is to only set aside circumstances where the situation is changing rapidly, essentially — I think you said “volatile” and “rapidly changing” or wording to that effect. That makes a lot of sense. But sometimes the problem is not that the situation is changing as such; it’s that our knowledge of the situation is evolving rapidly. Maybe those are the same things, and they are, please tell us that. But we could have a situation where we just don’t have enough experience with the problem we’re facing, and we need time to accumulate knowledge and experience, and modify regulations as knowledge accumulates, even though the situation itself is static, if you know what I mean.
I just wonder if you thought that the circumstance I described would be covered in your verbiage.
Mr. Abel: That’s a good point. I would agree. In fact, the evolution of the pandemic and of these orders reflects both of those aspects that knowledge about the virus and how it was transmitted was uncertain at the time, and our understanding of it was changing as time went on. The changes in the orders reflect that as well.
I have attempted to make some allowance for that in the principle I have suggested within the time frames provided for in the scheme in the act. As I mentioned at the end, I think it would be permissible to make another order on the same subject where it is necessary — and the key word is “necessary” — to urgently make substantive changes to an existing order. If it were possible to move through the process and make changes in the next step in that process, such as in the proposed regulatory enactment, that wouldn’t apply, of course, but where it were necessary to act immediately, then I think that could be permissible. We’ve seen that in these orders, and the committee will see that in other orders made during the pandemic.
Mr. Warkentin: Mr. Abel, I do appreciate the effort you have undertaken to find a solution. It is essential that consecutive orders not be allowed to continue at ministerial discretion. I think every Canadian understands the changing and evolving circumstances that we all came through, but during that period of time when Parliament and cabinet met, there would have been alternative mechanisms. Especially with the technologies we have today, I can’t conceive of a situation in which there couldn’t be a mechanism to go back to ensure that consecutive orders aren’t just piled on top of one another simply at the discretion of a single minister.
We need to visit this and build some parameters around it. I’m not opposed to the suggestion you have made, but as parliamentarians, we have a responsibility to ensure these absolute powers aren’t granted to ministerial orders like we have seen, because I believe that power could be misused.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Mr. Abel, is there any way those comments can be built into any correspondence or communication you’re having? Do you have any comments?
Mr. Abel: Any letter that will be sent on this file will incorporate, to a large degree, the elements put in the note that was prepared for members today, which, as I mentioned, not only turn on “necessity” repeatedly in the principle, as stated, but that the comments made to the department or the minister, as the case may be, will emphasize that this will be a strictly and narrowly construed exception, and that in almost all other circumstances, the principle the committee has already observed — that the approach is not authorized — would carry the day.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): How would you define “necessity” in that situation?
Mr. Abel: That’s sort of the nub of it, isn’t it? That would be a question that would have to turn on the factual basis of what the orders were responding to. I would suggest that in the committee’s job of carrying out its work, it would ask the department to provide a factual justification for the necessity, or the minister, as the case may be. But that would have to be made on a case-by-case basis since this would be a principle that would allow responding to a volatile and turbulent emergency, and there is no saying in the future what such an emergency could be.
Mr. Warkentin: It would be difficult for us to say that it was authorized, in the past tense, if the principle is to be established. We should say that it was unauthorized; we recognize why it was undertaken, but it was unauthorized. Otherwise, all it will require is — I just don’t know how we could say it was authorized at that time but it will never be authorized in the future. I think the principle has to be that it was unauthorized, there was universal recognition that things need to be undertaken and changes needed to be recognized, but I think we should say that it was unauthorized and if the corrective actions need to be undertaken now, that would be fine. But if we will say in the future that it’s unauthorized, I think we have to say that we believe that the previous action was unauthorized as well.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Mr. Abel, did you have a comment on that?
Mr. Abel: If I may make a suggestion, on the previous two files, the committee has decided to write again to suggest that perhaps the scheme in the act needs to be reconsidered.
Perhaps this is an opening to also make the suggestion that the kind of principle the committee is considering should also be the kind of principle enshrined in the act and that the department should consider proposing it to Parliament as well. It certainly would be preferable if such limitations, restrictions and exceptions were set out expressly by Parliament in the act.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): That may be a helpful suggestion.
Mr. Garon: I recognize that executive power is necessary and that it is exactly the job of the executive to try to impose decrees quickly in urgent circumstances where the facts change rapidly.
I still have a problem with what is being proposed. The legislation clearly sets out a process, and I feel — and perhaps Mr. Abel can tell me — that we are going beyond the mandate of the committee in doing this.
De facto, it has never been tolerated in history that we operate by cumulative temporary decrees. Suddenly, this time, because of the circumstances, it is pointed out that the legislator did not think about this. Therefore, the law was not appropriate for exceptional circumstances. So, in the future, this behaviour will be tolerated if the circumstances arise again.
I have two observations.
The first observation is that the circumstances in which this would be accepted under the proposal that is being made happen extremely rarely. This appears to be the first time in the history of this law that it can be said that successive executive orders would be tolerated. This suggests that the government would have sufficient time to have the legislative framework amended if it so desired.
Secondly, there is a practice in the Department of Transport to operate in this way in urgent or non-urgent circumstances. Even if the committee decides to point out to the minister and the department that the circumstances are very limited, I am not naturally inclined to believe that this will not be interpreted, in effect, as an “open bar” by the government.
It would seem to me appropriate, in the spirit of what was done earlier, to mention that the legislative framework did not apply to such exceptional circumstances and that thought should be given to modernizing the law. This puts the committee in the position of writing legislation. The process must ultimately go through Parliament. Could we go further in this direction? It seems constructive to me.
It seems to me important that the legislative framework be appropriate if we have to deal with another pandemic or another national crisis one day. We would be doing Canadians, Quebecers and the government a favour by moving in this direction.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Thank you, Mr. Garon.
Mr. Abel, do you think with the feedback you’ve received from the two different members, this can be incorporated in a coherent way and that we can respond in a slightly modified way, as you’ve suggested?
Mr. Abel: Yes, I think I can incorporate all members’ comments into text.
My question for the committee would be — and this would relate to all the files we’ve discussed so far, since it seems these two issues are both coalescing to suggest an update to the scheme in the act — is whether this letter should go to the department or if a letter should be drafted for the joint chairs to the minister. Since the committee will be suggesting the potential for major legislative changes, the latter might be more appropriate.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): I’ll look to the members for an answer, but I think that would be a fairly good suggestion. Under those circumstances, that may be the case. I see a lot of thumbs up and nodding, so let’s proceed with it as a letter to the minister with the feedback you’ve received from members being incorporated, if you can.
Mr. Abel: I can do that, yes.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Thanks very much. We have more under that item as well. Please proceed.
Mr. Abel: Quickly, I have a few remaining items on this file.
Items 2 and 3 in the correspondence in counsel’s initial letter had noted publication and tabling requirements in the act that applied to interim orders had not, in most cases, been properly met. Once notified of this deficiency, the department belatedly published the prior orders and ensured that future orders were published and tabled as required. The validity of the orders is not affected by these deficiencies. With respect to publication, the orders were all nonetheless made available on the department’s website in a timely manner. Given the circumstances of the early pandemic and the efforts by the department once counsel notified it of these deficiencies, no further action seems necessary on these points.
Next, as set out in some detail towards the end of the note, several other issues were raised regarding various orders in this series. These may all be considered resolved by successor orders or otherwise satisfactory. These matters include inconsistencies between provisions or between the French and English versions, clarifications regarding the precise obligations regarding face masks and an accidental failure to designate one provision for the purposes of administrative monetary penalties.
Finally, some drafting errors were noted in the transitional provisions of some orders, which could have affected the proper repeal of prior orders. Fortunately, in this case, the errors were unlikely to have a negative effect.
That deals with the remaining issues.
INTERIM ORDER(S) TO PREVENT CERTAIN PERSONS FROM BOARDING FLIGHTS IN CANADA DUE TO COVID-19, NOS. 1-7 (U2020-3)
(For text of document, see Appendix E, p. 5E:1.)
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Mr. Abel, you still have one more item on the agenda, the interim orders to prevent certain persons from boarding flights in Canada due to COVID-19. This is numbers 1 through 7. Is that another item?
Mr. Abel: Yes, it is. At this point in time, Transport Canada with the Minister of Transport enacted two separate sets of orders dealing with flights originating out of Canada and inside Canada, although they largely mirrored each other in their substantive provisions.
The issues raised on this file were very similar to the last. The same analysis applies. There’s really nothing particular to raise here, so if members prefer, I will simply follow the advice decided upon in the last file.
Mr. Warkentin: I just want to clarify, in terms of the travel from Canada, which date was the new order set forward?
Mr. Abel: The first one in this series or the time over which they spanned? I can find that quickly. Give me a moment, please.
Mr. Warkentin: Specifically, did the change in order include the provision to disallow unvaccinated Canadians from boarding aircraft?
Mr. Abel: No. This series of orders only spans from March to about June 2020. It was superseded by later sets of orders. Over the span of the pandemic, there have been a number of successive series of orders that have been given new names or have been combined or de-combined, and they’ve all been handled under different files, which will be coming to the committee in the future. However, as these ended in summer 2020, vaccination was simply not a reality yet.
Mr. Warkentin: Thank you. That’s helpful.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): The suggestion is that we essentially group this in with the correspondence that we were already giving instruction for counsel to send to the minister. Is that satisfactory to members, or is there any other commentary or discussion? We can assume that’s satisfactory and proceed accordingly.
That concludes your items for the time being.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): The next item is under “Reply Satisfactory.”
SI/2019-33 — ORDER DESIGNATING CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA TO BE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT AND CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THAT ACT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES: (1) THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS; (2) THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT; AND (3) THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(For text of documents, see Appendix F, p. 5F:1.)
Geoff Hilton, Counsel to the Committee: This is the first time this file has come before the committee.
In the text of this order-in-council, the Privy Council has repeated some of the language that was in the former enabling provision of the order-in-council, rather than using the language of the current enabling provision.
While the use of the obsolete terminology ultimately had no effect on the validity of the order-in-council, it is still preferable, as a matter of good drafting practice, that orders-in-council and regulations reflect the terminology used in their enabling provision.
It is also worth mentioning that the Privy Council has in the past used the wording of enabling statutes in other similar orders-in-council.
The Privy Council has never indicated whether it will refrain from using the obsolete language and, as of today, no further orders-in-council have been made under the enabling legislation, so legal counsel cannot confirm whether or not the obsolete language will continue to be used.
I therefore defer to members as to whether they wish to seek confirmation that future orders-in-council of this type will be made using the language of the current enabling legislation, or whether they wish to close the file, but include in a final letter that the committee expects the current language to be used and will monitor future orders-in-council to ensure compliance.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): A decision point there, it sounds like. Are there any comments, suggestions or discussion?
Mr. Garon: I would suggest that we send a letter and simply ask for confirmation.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is everyone okay with that? It appears there’s no disagreement, so we can consider that the planned course of action.
Thank you, Mr. Hilton.
SOR/2008-124 — BOWIE SEAMOUNT MARINE PROTECTED AREA REGULATIONS
(For text of documents, see Appendix G, p. 5G:1.)
Mr. Abel: This is another file the committee had pursued for many years. The one outstanding matter left is related to the Marine Protected Area Management Plan.
The committee sought to ensure that the plan, which is an administrative document connected to the regulations, did not set out binding rules that were not reflected in the regulations and the act.
The management plan was finally completed in mid-2019 and is now published. It has been confirmed to not contain any unauthorized elements. This issue could therefore be considered satisfactory, and the file may be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is that agreed? It appears so.
SOR/2012-143 — REGULATIONS AMENDING THE BROADCASTING DISTRIBUTION REGULATIONS
(For text of documents, see Appendix H, p. 5H:1.)
Mr. Hilton: An issue was raised with the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission in July 2016 regarding a discrepancy between the English and French versions of a provision.
In its response, the CRTC did not comment on this issue, but indicated that the provision in question would be redrafted as part of the planned amendments to the regulations. The provision was subsequently repealed in 2017, so there is no further follow-up to be done. Therefore, this file can be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is that agreed? It appears so.
SOR/2017-11 — REGULATIONS AMENDING THE EXPORT OF SUBSTANCES ON THE EXPORT CONTROL LIST REGULATIONS
(For text of documents, see Appendix I, p. 5I:1.)
Mr. Hilton: This is the first time this file has come before the committee.
An issue was raised with the Department of the Environment in March 2018 regarding a discrepancy between the English and French versions of a provision, and the necessary changes were made six months later. Therefore, this file can be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is that agreed? It appears so.
SOR/2018-202 — REGULATIONS AMENDING THE SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS REGULATIONS (CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION)
(For text of documents, see Appendix J, p. 5J:1.)
Mr. Abel: These amending regulations address numerous concerns identified by the committee in connection with SOR/2004-155. These amendments correct drafting errors and discrepancies between the French and English versions, remove redundant passages and clarify some provisions. They also enshrine an implied procedural requirement and narrow an overly broad authorization that permits government officials to handle chemical weapons.
The amending regulations have been found to comply with all the committee’s criteria, and this file may therefore be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is it agreed? It appears so.
SOR/2019-61 — REGULATIONS AMENDING CERTAIN REGULATIONS MADE UNDER THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC MEASURES ACT
(For text of documents, see Appendix K, p. 5K:1.)
Mr. Abel: These amending regulations address numerous concerns raised by the committee in connection with several regulations made under the Special Economic Measures Act.
These amendments remove language that could have been seen to infringe the right to free speech, provide clearer protection against the possibility of compelled self-incrimination and correct drafting errors and outdated cross-references.
This instrument also amends several other regulations that have not yet been reviewed but which contained provisions similar to those that the committee had objected to. This file does not give rise to any new issues and may therefore be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is that agreed? Okay.
SOR/2020-46 — REGULATIONS AMENDING THE CHROMIUM ELECTROPLATING, CHROMIUM ANODIZING AND REVERSE ETCHING REGULATIONS
(For text of documents, see Appendix L, p. 5L:1.)
Mr. Hilton: This is the first time this issue has come before the committee. This amending regulation addresses the three issues raised in 2012 with respect to SOR/2009-162, Chromium Electroplating, Chromium Anodizing and Reverse Etching Regulations.
Specifically, the amendments correct a title, address two discrepancies between the English and French versions of the regulations, and remove a reference to an external referenced document that was not accessible.
In addition, the changes also address the lack of clarity regarding certain laboratory accreditations, an issue that had been raised in another file but was nonetheless relevant to this regulation.
So, if members agree, these two files can be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Is that agreed?
Hon. Members: Agreed.
SOR/2020-92 — REGULATIONS AMENDING THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION REGULATIONS
(For text of documents, see Appendix M, p. 5M:1.)
Mr. Abel: This amending regulation adds subsection 47(4) to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. This was in response to a recommendation made by the committee in connection with SOR/2002-227.
Subsection 47(4) sets out certain factors that a government official must consider when deciding whether a person will be allowed to provide a guarantee in relation to various obligations imposed under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or the regulations. It was the view of the committee that enshrining these factors in legislation would reduce the risk that a person may be subject to the arbitrary or inconsistent exercise of discretionary power by administrative officials. This amendment raises no new issues and this file may therefore be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Agreed? We have agreement there.
Next on our agenda we have a series of statutory instruments without comment. Our lead counsel will present on that.
SI/2018-57 — ORDER TERMINATING THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE HONOURABLE (1) KIRSTY DUNCAN; (2) BARDISH CHAGGER; (3) MARIE-CLAUDE BIBEAU; (4) MARYAM MONSEF; AND (5) KIRSTY DUNCAN
SI/2018-58 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MINISTER OF SCIENCE
SI/2018-59 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MINISTER OF SMALL BUSINESS AND TOURISM
SI/2018-60 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MINISTER OF SPORT AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
SI/2018-63 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE DEPARTMENT OF (1) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT; (2) CANADIAN HERITAGE; AND (3) INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO THE MINISTER OF LA FRANCOPHONIE
SI/2018-64 — ORDER ASSIGNING THE HONOURABLE DOMINIC LEBLANC, A MINISTER OF STATE TO ASSIST THE MINISTER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT
SI/2018-66 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF STATUS OF WOMEN, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, TO CO-ORDINATE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND ADMINISTER RELATED PROGRAMS
SI/2018-67 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF SCIENCE, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND ENGINEERING RESEARCH COUNCIL ACT AND AS THE APPROPRIATE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT
SI/2018-68 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF SCIENCE, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL ACT AND AS THE APPROPRIATE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT
SI/2018-70 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF HEALTH, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT IN RESPECT OF PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF SPORT AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT IN RESPECT OF SPORT
SI/2018-71 — TRANSFER OF DUTIES ORDER
SI/2018-72 — TRANSFER OF DUTIES ORDER
SI/2018-73 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF SMALL BUSINESS AND TOURISM, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT
SI/2018-74 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF SMALL BUSINESS AND TOURISM, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT
SI/2018-75 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF SMALL BUSINESS AND TOURISM, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, (1) AS THE DESIGNATED MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BANK OF CANADA ACT; AND (2) AS THE APPROPRIATE MINISTER WITH RESPECT TO THE BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT BANK OF CANADA FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT
SI/2018-76 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE HONOURABLE CARLA QUALTROUGH, A MINISTER OF THE CROWN, TO BE”THE MINISTER” FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT
SI/2018-79 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT
SI/2018-80 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE MINISTER OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, A MEMBER OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA, AS THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER FOR THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT
SI/2018-88 — ORDER DESIGNATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE QUEEN’S PRIVY COUNCIL FOR CANADA TO BE THE MINISTER REFERRED TO IN THE ACT
Tanya Dupuis, General Counsel to the Committee: Thank you, chair. The final matter for today is a list of 19 statutory instruments that have been reviewed by committee counsel and found to comply with all of the joint committee’s criteria. If a member of the committee would like to consult these statutory instruments, a copy could be made available upon request, but it’s our recommendation that these files can be closed.
The Joint Chair (Mr. Richards): Are we agreed? It appears as though we’re agreed. Thank you. That concludes our agenda for today.
(The committee adjourned.)