In the wake of the successful NATO
Summit in Lisbon at the end of 2010, the Alliance now faces the critical task
of turning the political commitments made at the meeting into concrete actions
and real capabilities. This was among the main themes discussed during a visit
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee to the
United States January 31-February 4, 2011.
The delegation, composed of 38
legislators from 20 NATO member states, was led by Committee Chairman Senator
Joseph A. Day from Canada.
The Committee’s mission to the United
States, undertaken annually at the invitation of the U.S. House of
Representatives, this year included dialogue with Congressional leaders of both
Houses as well as senior officials from the Departments of State and
Defense. The delegation also met with independent experts at the
Council on Foreign Relations. Finally, the delegation travelled to
San Diego, California, to inspect U.S. Navy assets, including a missile defence-capable
guided missile destroyer and one of two cutting-edge Littoral Combat Ships.
The wide-ranging discussions centred on
the following themes, among others: the evolution of NATO, and its
top priority operation in Afghanistan; missile defence; the rapidly developing
situation in Egypt and across north Africa; relations with Russia; defence
spending in an age of austerity; and the implications of the new configuration
of the U.S. political system as a result of the November 2010 legislative
elections.
NATO AFTER LISBON
The Lisbon Summit could be seen as the
rollout of “NATO 3.0”, according to the Pentagon’s Ambassador Alexander
Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. If NATO’s first incarnation was about cold war-era defence
against the Warsaw Pact, and 2.0 was defined by the Alliance’s efforts to
integrate former cold war adversaries, NATO 3.0 was equipping itself to deal
with the new challenges of the 21st century.
In that regard, Ambassador Vershbow
commented, the Lisbon summit was a great success in terms of what was agreed;
however, the hard work of implementing the agreed decisions was only just
beginning and would be made harder by the global economic downturn.
As Allies looked to the progress necessary before NATO’s 2012 Summit,
they would have to abandon 50 years of inefficient business practices; the
economic crisis provided the impetus to do just that. The agreed
streamlining of the committees at NATO headquarters and of the military command
structure were difficult decisions, but the choices of where to cut would be
harder still.
In order to increase efficiencies in
capabilities, Ambassador Vershbow called for greater pooling of resources and
greater efforts toward specialization in ‘niche capabilities’ to arrive at economies
of scale. The greatest possible coordination and transparency
through the Alliance’s defence planning process was necessary in order to
ensure no decision by a single nation would unbalance NATO as a whole.
The recent UK-France defence agreement
on collaboration on capabilities could serve as a guidepost for other allies,
said Julianne Smith, Principal Director for Europe and NATO at the Department
of Defense. Smith further underlined that this cooperation, as well
as other efforts such as Germany’s transformation plans, should be coordinated
with NATO; Allied Command Transformation could play a particularly useful role
here.
NATO was probably not the key player on
combating piracy in the long term, according to Smith, who pointed out that the
Alliance did not have the institutional tools to get at the root cause of the
problem on shore; the U.S. remained very supportive of EU efforts on this
issue.
Smith suggested there was a greater
need to learn the lessons of previous operations and translate them into
current and future engagements. One such lesson was the need to
integrate civil and military efforts, including having reconstruction as a key
pillar of any operation going forward. In particular, with a few
exceptions, nations generally lack deployable civilian capabilities. The
need for developing capabilities in this area was one of the key conclusions of
the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which had espoused a
vision to get beyond ad hoc, under-funded civilian capabilities for operations.
Smith also suggested that the U.S. would like to see the EU take on a greater
role in reconstruction activities.
The agenda going towards the next
summit in 2012 would be focused on four priorities, according to State
Department officials: providing resources to ISAF; organizing the
Deterrence and Defence Posture Review to examine the appropriate mix of
nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities required by NATO;
reforming NATO structures; and modernizing partnerships.
Defense department officials confirmed
that discussions on reviewing the U.S. force posture in Europe were underway at
the time of the visit, having been postponed until after the Lisbon
Summit. Indeed, Defence Secretary Gates had been quoted as stating
that there was excess force structure in Europe.
Consultations with Allies were scheduled to take place shortly after the
time of the visit. Underpinning these discussions would be consideration
of the appropriate mix of assets in Europe, to include missile defence
elements, counter-terrorism forces, maritime security assets, and perhaps fewer
ground forces geared to the challenges of the cold war. A changed posture
would, defence officials stated, continue to ensure visible reassurance to
European Allies.
AFGHANISTAN
Progress in Afghanistan had been even
greater than expected in recent months, according to David Samuel Sedney,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central
Asia. The additional forces deployed as part of ISAF, as well as
the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces, were producing effects that
were fundamentally changing the rules of the game, especially in the Taliban
heartland areas of Kandahar and Helmand provinces.
The gains won in recent months – in
particular, pushing the Taliban out of major populated areas, leading to
greater numbers of Afghans feeling safer – remained fragile and reversible,
according to Sedney, who underlined that Afghan leadership will be required to
sustain them. Afghans were willing and now increasingly able to
contribute, but still needed a great deal of assistance in developing civilian
capacity in particular.
The NATO-Afghanistan Enduring
Partnership agreed at the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon represented a
commitment that, despite calling for a transfer of security responsibility to
the Afghan government by 2014, was not time-limited in its overall scope,
according to Sedney. The U.S. had also committed on a bilateral
basis to a bolstered partnership with Afghanistan.
Mr. Sedney predicted that violence
would increase over the next months until the summer, as the insurgents seek to
regain areas lost over the last 3-6 months and as international and Afghan
forces continue to push out into previously uncontested areas.
Thus, increased reporting of violent incidents in the short term should
not be seen as evidence of failure, he emphasized, but rather the normal course
of the overall strategy.
The pocess of transitioning areas to
Afghan security lead would be governed by a joint, Afghan-ISAF process that
would review, province-by-province, what areas would be suitable.
U.S. officials underlined that as transition occurred in various areas of
Afghanistan, international forces deployed to those areas should not
automatically be withdrawn; rather, they should be reinvested and
either deployed into other parts of Afghanistan or as part of other lines of
the operation, such as a shift from combat operations to training.
Decisions on troop withdrawals should, they emphasized, be coordinated at the
NATO level.
Senator Lindsey Graham urged the
delegates to support the deployment of additional trainers to accelerate the
development of the Afghan National Security Forces; to support programs to
address the acute problem areas of rule of law and governance; and to support a
coordinated approach aimed at encouraging Pakistan to address the problem of
safe havens for insurgents. Senator Graham stated that the
resources devoted through the end of the year would be decisive in the Afghan
campaign, which would eventually demonstrate whether NATO remained a credible
and reliable actor on the international stage.
CYBER STRATEGY
The cyber-related outcomes of NATO’s
Lisbon Summit were very encouraging, according to Defense Department expert
Steven Schleien. Increased political attention to the issue and
plans to augment the protection afforded NATO’s own networks were seen as
positive steps, as was the commitment to assist member nations in their own
defensive efforts and the incorporation of cyber dimensions into planning and
exercises. NATO should not define whether a given type of cyber
attack would fall under Article 5, according to Schleien; the very ambiguity of
such a posture would enhance deterrence. Article 4 security consultations
were, in any case, always available to member states who considered themselves
under threat.
While NATO was not developing offensive
cyber-capabilities, Schleien pointed out that the Alliance could always request
assistance in producing a given cyber-effect from the small group of member
states that had developed such capabilities, in arrangements somewhat analogous
to NATO’s nuclear posture.
The U.S. does not see how the classic
model of arms control treaties applies in the area of cyber-security, but does
support the establishment of international norms through expert bodies in
organizations such as the United Nations.
Generally speaking, Schleien warned,
the technical sophistication required for a potential attacker to present a threat
in cyberspace has decreased dramatically over time. The U.S.
strategy has relied on building resilience in systems in order to defeat cyber
attacks and maintaining a deterrent posture that includes the threat of kinetic
retaliation for a politically-attributable cyber-attack, he stated.
One challenge the Defence Department faced was recruiting and retaining
technically skilled personnel to address the threat; many of these experts were
lured away from public service by the private sector.
MISSILE DEFENCE
The Obama administration saw missile
defence as an integral part of maintaining extended deterrence and assurance,
and to meeting rising threats without creating instabilities, according to Dr.
Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy. While the threat to the homeland was growing, the
U.S. had assets in place to maintain a strong and well-hedged position through
its Phased Adaptive Approach, which provided for re-locatable assets and capabilities
to meet evolving threats.
There was consensus within the Alliance
about the growing Iranian ballistic missile threat to southern Europe,
according to the Defence Department’s Ambassador Vershbow, and Iran would have
capabilities within the decade that would put the entire territory of the
Alliance at risk. Dr. Roberts underlined that conventional
approaches to deterrence may not be applicable in the case of Iran’s
leadership. Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor on Iran and North Korea
at the Department of State, suggested that the concern was that Iran would be
emboldened by a nuclear capability, presenting additional regional security
challenges.
NATO missile defence was a relative
bargain, according to defence officials, who underlined that the U.S. was
contributing, on a national basis, an entire architecture of sensors and
interceptors. NATO’s potential investments in a command and control
system (which would allow nations to ‘plug in’ their respective sensors and
interceptors) to achieve complete coverage of Allied territory were extremely
modest by comparison, amounting to less than 200 million euros over 10
years.
While command and control arrangements
for the NATO system had yet to be determined, NATO had successfully made
similarly complex arrangements in the past with other systems, Such
discussions, including decisions on rules of engagement, will
unsurprisingly take time to sort out, according to Roberts.
The U.S. viewed missile defence as a
compliment and not a substitute for extended deterrence based on nuclear
weapons. Allies had decided to undertake a Defence and Deterrence
Posture Review (DDPR) to discuss these issues as they looked toward their 2012
Summit meeting.
RUSSIA
The
improvement in relations with Russia was real, according to State Department
officials, who nevertheless underlined that principles such as host-nation
consent for the stationing of foreign troops, issues of particular relevance in
Georgia and Moldova, would not be sacrificed.
The re-set of relations with Russia was
possibly the most impressive foreign policy achievement by the Obama
administration to date, according to Steve Sestanovich, Senior Fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations. However, it remained to be seen
whether it could overcome the historical pattern of re-sets being followed by
high expectations and eventually disappointment and hostility.
While Sestanovich thought it had been a good calculation to downplay
disagreements on Georgia, Russian leaders viewed this as acquiescence by the west;
the west therefore needed to re-engage on this issue in order to avoid a
miscalculation by Russia. The major benchmarks of the relationship
in the coming period were likely to include Russian domestic politics
(parliamentary and presidential elections); high-profile repression of
political dissidents; and Russian accession to the World Trade
Organization.
The U.S. administration viewed
cooperation with Russia on missile defence as important, but would not agree to
a fully integrated joint system, with shared command and control, which Russian
officials have advocated. Russia could provide potentially valuable
sensor information that could improve NATO’s defences – and the reverse was
also true, according to the Pentagon’s Dr. Roberts. Discussions
with Russia on missile defence cooperation were underway both in the
NATO-Russia Council and through bilateral U.S.-Russia meetings.
U.S. POLITICS
Cutting spending was a key priority of
the new leadership of the House of Representatives, according to Congressman
Dan Burton, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Europe and Eurasia.
Representative Mike Turner, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, and Congressman Jeff Miller, a member of the
delegation, suggested that difficult choices would have to be made on
entitlement spending. Rep. Turner underlined his view that the U.S.
public was ready to support reforms.
The polarization of the U.S. political
system was as extreme as it has been at any time since the 19th century,
according to Charles Kupchan, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations. Divisions on social issues had been a constant, but had
not until recently spilled over to issues of foreign policy, which had
historically been seen as an area beyond the reach of partisanship.
Kupchan attributed this in part to the gradual disappearance of the
post-WWII generation of internationalist politicians.
Indeed, the divide was not just between
Democrats and Republicans, but also within the Republican Party itself, with
the emergence of the Tea Party representing a splintering of the Republican
Party, with a new generation that did not share the values of its
leadership. The domestic political situation had strangled the
ability of this White House to make strategic leaps, according to Steven
Clemons, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, who predicted that
politics in Washington – particularly in Congress – would only get more toxic
in the next two years.
Kupchan predicted a period of
retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy, with consensus across the political system
on ‘lightening the load’ on the U.S. of its commitments abroad. As
a result, the U.S. would be looking for Europe to do more on the international
stage.
When asked about the impacts of the
“wikileaks” controversy, senior officials from different executive branch
agencies expressed their regret that the information had been made public, and
stated that it was a result of the much greater sharing of information across
the U.S. institutions after the 9/11 attacks, which was intended to improve the
chances that terrorist plots would be uncovered. The extent of the
information sharing was now being rebalanced, officials told the
delegation. While the scandal has done enduring damage to
diplomats’ ability to have candid conversations with trusted interlocutors, the
cables have also demonstrated that the U.S. largely relates the same message
publicly and privately.
MILITARY SITE VISITS
The delegation travelled to San Diego,
California, in order to visit the U.S. Navy Combined Third Fleet Headquarters .
Command Third Fleet is the command for all naval units on the West Coast,
covering the eastern Pacific from the international dateline to the U.S., from
the North Pole to the South Pole. The delegation was briefed on the
command’s functions, the massive RIMPAC naval exercises, in which a number of
NATO Allies participate; the command’s approach to cyberdefence; and its
support of the ballistic missile defence mission.
At the U.S. Naval Base in San Diego, the
delegation visited the USS Freedom Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-1), a fast, agile,
focused-mission platform designed for operation in near-shore environments yet
capable of open-ocean operation. It is designed to defeat asymmetric
“anti-access” threats such as mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface
craft and has both military and humanitarian applications. Its
principal innovation is its capacity to change out ‘mission modules’ of
capabilities specifically designed for one of three missions, to include
anti-submarine warfare, humanitarian assistance, and de-mining. It
is also characterized by its small crew and highly automated control
systems. The U.S. Navy planned to purchase 55 Littoral Combat Ships, the
delegation was told.
The delegation also visited the USS
John Paul Jones DDG-53 Ballistic Missile Defence-capable Destroyer.
The John Paul Jones was one of 21 ships equipped with the Aegis system
designed to defeat ballistic missile threats. The ships together
form the sea-based element of the overall ballistic missile defence system and
represent the cornerstone of the Obama Administration’s Phased Adaptive
Approach to missile defence for Europe.
Finally,
the delegation reviewed impressive technological innovations being developed at
the Systems Command Pacific military facility of the U.S. Navy’s Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Command. These included a seawater-based antenna;
new means of efficiently sorting and processing news articles to extract the
most valuable open source information; a wirelessly communicating,
sensor-enabled glove; and high-performance unmanned force protection vehicles.