The third Strategic Concept seminar,
“NATO’s Partnerships and Beyond”, took place in Oslo on 14 January 2010. The
event brought together members of the Group of Experts on NATO’s new Strategic
Concept, government and military officials, representatives of international
organisations and NGOs, independent experts, and journalists. NATO partner
countries and other cooperation fora were also well represented. Senator
Pierre Claude Nolin was Canada’s representative.
PARTNERSHIPS
GENERAL:
·NATO now has more partners than members. Most
participants agreed that the structure and purposes of the current system of
partnerships need to be reassessed. Speakers from partner countries noted that
the system does not meet their needs adequately and find significant gaps between
their expectations and reality. There is a need for both NATO and partner
governments to strike a balance between expecting too much and delivering too
little. Partnerships must be mutually advantageous. NATO must be attractive to
partners.
·The current system is rooted in the strategic
realities of the 1990s, when partnerships were largely driven by the demands of
partners in Central and Eastern Europe interested in drawing closer to NATO and
linked to preparations for membership. The question now is how to make the
system attractive to a more diverse array of countries that are not pushing for
closer ties to the Alliance, but where there are opportunities for
mutually-beneficial dialogue and cooperation in security affairs.
·Several speakers noted that partners have
varying degrees of convergence with the Alliance’s core values and commitment
to effective cooperation. There is a group of countries that embrace NATO’s
core values, have common security concerns, and are deeply committed to close
ties with the Alliance. Another group of “instrumental partners” does not share
NATO’s core values and neither seeks nor can sustain closer engagement with
NATO, but finds it useful to cooperate in certain areas. Should Allies just
accept this situation or differentiate the scope of partnerships based on
commitment to common values and level of engagement? One speaker argued that
continuation of the principle of self-differentiation is the best way to ensure
that partnerships neither expect too much nor demand too little.
PURPOSE:
·The vision and purpose of current partnerships
are not clear. Many partners have the sense that NATO is actively seeking their
contributions to current operations, but they don’t see a clear strategic
direction in the relationships.
·Should the partnership architecture be shaped by
operational cooperation or a broader function? One speaker asked what
partnerships are committed to or against in the evolving global security
environment? He argued that the goals of partnership have evolved somewhat by
default to deal with pressing security challenges from instability in the
Balkans in the 1990s, to transnational terrorism after 2001, to disruptions to
global stability and commerce more recently. Some partners and NATO members
have more traditional concerns and are not fully committed to this global
agenda. Some partners are involved in Afghanistan largely out of a desire to
enlist attention and support from the United States. Is there a need to put
current operations and other forms of cooperation into a more strategic, global
context?
·Several participants argued that the structure
of partnerships has largely been driven by operational cooperation, but could
serve larger purposes, such as fostering regional stability and understanding.
·Speakers generally agreed that flexibility
should remain a major feature of partnerships: no one size fits all. Several
welcomed specialized functional and regional approaches, for example in the
Black Sea and the Caspian, but opposed regional divisions of labour that would
take on or limit regional responsibility. NATO and partners could enhance
cooperation with existing regional structures and various countries,
particularly those that are not members of security organizations. For others,
NATO should avoid regional tags that create “backyards” for which certain
organizations will claim leadership. It is important to keep the East-West
linkage and thus avoid excessive regionalisation.
·Resources: The Partnership for Peace Framework
Document notes that partners should fund their involvement in partnership
activities and exercises. One speaker noted that limited resources available
for partnership activities have led to uneven engagement of some countries. He
suggested that common funding and voluntary contributions be solicited. Allies
and partners could create trust funds for areas of cooperation as well as
certain countries needing assistance.
·Consultations on security concerns: Several speakers called for making dialogue in the EAPC more
central and focused on the common strategic concerns of NATO members and
partners. Under paragraph 8 of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document,
NATO commits to consult with any active Partnership for Peace participant if
that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political
independence, or security. One speaker argued that the Russia-Georgia War
revealed such consultations to be inadequate. This speaker argued for
developing a new system of guarantees for certain vulnerable Partners that is
different from Article 5, but more robust than consultations. However, some
questioned whether such steps would dilute the value of Article 5.
MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE (MD) AND
ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE (ICI)
·Regional dimension: Speakers noted that NATO has developed individual approaches to
countries in the region (North-South track), but has failed to develop a
sub-regional dimension that would help the development of a common security
architecture. This is important as many security issues are transversal.
Self-differentiation pushed to an extreme is not helpful as it introduces an
element of competition and rivalry among countries. A speaker noted that
observers in the region ask: Is NATO seeking to ensure its security interests
in the region, regional security, or the security of various regimes? Another
participant suggested that the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group should explore
ways to reassure the region about NATO’s intentions and that joint public
diplomacy initiatives could improve attitudes toward the Alliance. Cooperation
with NATO has no impact on local conflicts (e.g. Morocco and Algeria are more
engaged in security cooperation individually with NATO, than with each other,
though the same applies to relations with the EU). One speaker urged NATO to
develop relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council to bolster collective
security cooperation those states are pursuing and try to push Mediterranean
countries to do more among themselves. On MD and ICI linkage, there are
commonalities between both, but overall NATO should keep different approaches.
·Relations with MD and ICI: There is a widespread perception that MD is a second class
partnership – the region has no “Russia” to draw serious NATO attention. NATO
loses its role as stabilizer when it crosses the Mediterranean. There is a risk
of militarizing the response to social challenges, like migration, or to deal
only with the consequences as opposed to the root causes. A speaker urged that
ICI should be more inclusive and be expanded to Iraq and Yemen at some point in
the future, given their importance to regional security. However, it was also
noted that Saudi Arabia and Oman have taken a tentative approach to ICI.
·Potential areas of work: More emphasis is needed on multilateral approaches – the objective
of the MD should be to stabilize the region. NATO should consider the
development of a document on the strategic purpose of the MD, as it lacks a
founding act or a framework document like the Partnership for Peace, and it
should develop more cross-cutting activities. There is interest in discussing
denuclearization, counter-proliferation, including ballistic proliferation (the
impact in the region of the US Ballistic Missile Defence Review could be looked
into). One speaker said NATO should shy away from Security Sector Reform, as it
is a very sensitive area and NATO’s involvement would scare-off government
officials: in the region, national security, the security of the regime and
even the security of the ruling family are closely enmeshed. One speaker argued
that the small Gulf States have considerable bilateral security cooperation
with several Allied governments and that NATO’s engagement could be better
coordinated with these efforts to ensure an effective division of labour and
clarify NATO’s added value.
·Israel: One
speaker noted that Israel welcomes NATO’s engagement in the Middle East and
cooperation on global security challenges. Israel is adjusting its security
doctrine based on self-reliance to embrace principles of security cooperation.
Currently, Israel is interested in deepening its bilateral relationship with
NATO just short of membership by engaging in the full range of Partnership for
Peace programs. This could create tensions with other MD partners. It should be
possible to create an umbrella of cooperation for all, which would still allow
individual countries to follow their own path. Overall, NATO has a growing
relevance for Israel. Still, more could be done on regional aspects of new
threats, Iran, intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, exercises,
planning, etc. On the Middle East peace process, Israel’s partnership with NATO
should not be seen as a way to circumvent it, but to strengthen the process, as
it makes Israel feel more secure. NATO should actually consider a position in
advance of the peace process. One speaker argued that even membership in NATO
should not be ruled out, after a Middle East peace agreement. NATO could also
play a role as a guarantor of an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord. It was
suggested that this twin prospect would provide reassurance to Israel in
concluding a peace accord. Otherwise, the usual underlying tensions with MD and
ICI countries resurfaced during discussions – Gulf States don’t want any
involvement of Israel in ICI (although formally a Gulf State). One speaker
argued that suspicions that Israel seeks to influence NATO’s strategic concept
through an organized campaign will not help outreach to MD countries during the
new Strategic Concept process (see article in Jerusalem Post 13 January).
RUSSIA
·A speaker from a NATO member country advanced
several proposals for the future of NATO-Russian relations, noting the need to
restore confidence in light of negative developments in recent years:
1)Need to reach a new level of transparency: trust cannot be
rebuilt overnight and requires specific actions – e.g. a dialogue on defence
planning (a Russian proposal).
2)Confidence building: the OSCE Vienna
Document has a number of military confidence building mechanisms that could be
used more effectively and bilateral confidence building measures could be
developed – e.g. the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) could develop an exhaustive
catalogue of crisis situations and ways to avert future problems.
3)Implement the NRC work programme for 2010: this is a good
roadmap and joint exercises could be carried out on the basis of a joint threat
review – e.g. disaster relief in the Baltic area.
4)Conduct maritime security activities of mutual interest and
benefit – e.g. joint exercises on anti-piracy.
5)The most successful NRC working group is on ballistic missile
defence: the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence Review offers an opportunity
for further cooperative action in this area - e.g. table top exercises and
possible preparations for a live fire exercise.
6)The NRC should be used for more fundamental discussions and
crisis resolution: it must be made more resistant to possible crisis - NATO
made a mistake in suspending the NRC in August 2008; the NRC is not an
institution to rebalance power politics; it could be a useful mechanism for
crisis management.
7)Russia is in the process of transforming its military forces:
NATO could help in this effort of modernization.
8)NATO should maintain an Open Door policy towards Russia: the
argument that Russia will not ask for NATO membership is not cast in stone,
therefore NATO should start to consider what the parameters would be and what
would need to change to make Russia’s membership possible.
·Relations with Russia: A Russian speaker commented that cooperation in certain areas does
not mean a cooperative partnership. Another speaker argued that it was a
transactional relationship, not a partnership in that Moscow is seeking to link
cooperation on Afghanistan with a halt to NATO enlargement. The reality is that
there is a weaker partnership than in the 1990s. The high point of the
partnership was Russia’s participation in SFOR’s peace implementation
operations in Bosnia-Hercegovina. A Russian speaker noted that the NATO-Russia
dialogue has not enhanced confidence. Prime Minister Putin has expressed
disappointment that NATO is representated at meetings with an established,
coordinated position that leaves little room for compromise. The Georgian
crisis showed the limited added value of the partnership as it could be suspended.
One speaker said the ball is in Russia’s court as it will have to decide what
it wants: a partnership, realpolitik or an instrumental relationship. One
problem is the diminishing number of Russian supporters of partnership with
NATO. However, one Russian speaker argued that President Medvedev offers a
window of opportunity as he is open-minded about the prospects for developing a
good relationship with NATO and the economic crisis has led to a reset in
Moscow’s worldview. The challenge for NATO is to find a new modus Vivendi with
Russia. Cooperation on Afghanistan on the Northern Distribution Network can
help to some degree. However, Russia’s priority is maintaining influence in
Central Asia and the Caucasus, and it is deeply sceptical of U.S. and NATO intentions
in the region – it will risk relations with the West to defend its interests
there. Historically, Russia has been an integrator, not an integrate so
it also mistrusts European institutions. One speaker offered four possible
alternatives:
1)The bureaucratic model made up of working groups and
conferences, which is better than nothing, but not enough – the results of the
December ministerial point in this direction.
2)Practical cooperation in niche issues:
safety at sea, maritime security, etc., but which would not be central to
security interests.
3)NATO-CSTO cooperation instead of
bilateral cooperation, as suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski, although two
speakers noted that while CSTO had developed some useful cooperation on border
security, it is still an untested organization that may have more utility in
Central Asia than in the Caucasus, where only Armenia is a party. Several
participants suggested that NATO should also explore partnership with the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has fostered counter-terrorism and
counter-narcotics cooperation in Central Asia.
4)A more strategic approach by setting up a working group to look into
the potential integration of Russia.
·Medvedev Plan:
for one speaker, the plan reflects Russia’s desire to be heard on matters of
special concern, and the sense that a new forum it has designed would better
address those concerns. There is still frustration that NATO survived and the
Warsaw Treaty Organization did not, which accounts for some of the reservations
about the NATO-Russia channel. The Corfu process is the appropriate forum to
address this, because it encompasses all stakeholders and provides a
comprehensive approach to security. Still the results of Corfu are
disappointing and they risk diluting the Human Dimension of the OSCE, which is
crucial. Russian proposals should be taken into account if they provide added
value to Alliance security. One speaker said Medvedev Plan was the equivalent
of the 19th century Concert of Europe.
·Strategic reassurance: A Russian speaker asserted that the reinforcement of Article 5
through renewed military exercises is unnecessary and could lead to
remilitarization of border regions given the “zero probability” of a Russian
attack. Another Russian speaker asserted that the Russian military was in a
grave crisis with less than 10 percent of its forces maintained at high levels
of readiness and many senior commanders being replaced in the aftermath of the
operational shortcomings that were exposed during the war with Georgia. Still,
that speaker agreed there could still be a conflict between Russia and NATO, as
there is a risk of escalation. One participant noted that Russia should also do
more to reassure its neighbours, making fuller use of the Vienna Document and
other transparency measures. Another speaker warned about a “spiral of
reassurance” that could be counterproductive.
·Open Door policy:
Several speakers urged that Russian concerns about enlargement should be taken
into account, especially economic ones, although Russia has no veto. Georgia
and Ukraine are key tests of Russia’s relations with NATO. For one speaker, a
speedy accession of Russian neighbours will aggravate the European security
environment. For another, the problem is that Russia is concerned about the
lack of codification or formalisation of the current situation. Russian
membership of NATO should not be ruled out. Actually, NATO should evaluate all
the pros and cons of Russian accession and the costs of a still divided
European security system, something similar to the Cecchini report (a 1988
report that examined the benefits and costs of creating a single market in
Europe). NATO’s existential challenge is whether it will make Russia a
stakeholder in a stronger NATO.
·Disarmament: Iran
shows that the concept of deterrence must be rethought. Several speakers argued
that Russia should not be considered an adversary, so Cold War thinking cannot
continue and NATO needs to review its force posture. Germany will use the
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) review conference to
push for a withdrawal of sub-strategic nuclear arms from its territory. But,
this should not interfere with other disarmament initiatives. The NATO-Russia
Council should discuss nuclear issues like the old Permanent Joint Council used
to do. Nuclear disarmament should be accompanied by progress in conventional
disarmament.
·A Russian speaker commented that he was assured
by the openness and fairness of the overall discussion of NATO-Russia relations
at the seminar and would take that back to Moscow.
RAPPORTEUR
·The rapporteur offered additional perspectives
and a review of the seminar’s discussions. The new Strategic Concept should
give direction and legitimacy to NATO in a global security environment. NATO
can deal with global security challenges without becoming a global alliance. In
the future, NATO is more likely to have deeper partnerships than many new
members. Partnerships allow for relationships tailored to distinct needs and
interests: they can prepare partners for future membership; enhance
interoperability for joint operations; promote mutual confidence; support
transformation; and have a normative impact by bringing countries closer to
NATO’s political standards. Partnerships should continue to be interest-based.
Partners can be helpful, even if they are not democratic countries, although
such relationships have limits, as shared values allow for deeper ties. There
is some confusion as to what NATO could offer: NATO needs to clarify the limits
of its cooperation. NATO cannot provide security guarantees to all
Partners, but could widen the concept of consultations. Partners could
be involved in early warning and anticipation of risks to prevent state
failure. It is worth assessing threats and challenges together with Partners.
Security Sector Reform is high on the agenda, but there are sensitivities among
Partners. NATO must also contribute to building confidence among and with
partners through its bilateral relations.
·Russia is a much more complex partnership:
perceptions vary from an antagonistic relationship to a strategic partnership.
There is no NATO consensus on the current role of Russia, but there is
uncertainty among all 28 Allies about Russia’s future course. Whether Allies
are played off against each other depends more on themselves than on Russia.
NATO should enhance cooperation on common interests, which are wider with
Russia than with any other partner. Russia can be a partner both in the
European Security architecture and in global governance. Many felt NATO should
remain open to Russian membership if it makes a transition that reflects full
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours and a
desire to be a cooperative stakeholder in Euro-Atlantic security. This would
clearly be a different kind of NATO, and it would be important that it not look
like a directorate to third parties. Such a NATO would need to develop
relations with the other major world powers.
·Closing speakers noted that NATO’s partnerships have broken
barriers and built confidence. A strategic partnership with Russia should be
built on shared interests and not blocked by lingering differences. It was
noted that individuals can play an important role in developing these
relationships and that both Secretary General Rasmussen and President Medvedev
have made the development of a new NATO-Russia relationship a priority.
Respectfully submitted,
Mr. Leon
Benoit, M.P.
Chair Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)