The Canadian NATO Parliamentary
Association has the honour to present its report on the Visit to the United
States by the Defence and Security Committee, held January 26-30, 2009. The
Canadian delegation was represented by Senator Joseph Day.
OVERVIEW
As of late January, with the transition
to the Obama Administration only in its earliest stages, definitive statements
on major lines of the new government’s policy were impossible, outside of
several broad themes including increased attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
a greater multilateral and cooperative diplomatic engagement, and an intent to
improve relations with Russia.
In addition, a broad bipartisan
consensus in the United States regarding the overall value of pursuing missile
defences continues to hold, even if the Obama Administration has not as yet
expressed the same enthusiasm for these programs as its predecessor. The
future of the proposed deployments of system components in the Czech Republic
and Poland was very much undecided.
Finally, missile defence technology had
matured significantly during the Bush Administration, with operational
interceptors in California and Alaska as well as shorter-range systems tied
together with deployed sensors and satellites through a complex command and
control architecture intended to be interoperable with any future NATO
capabilities in this area. However, ongoing testing of long-range ground-based
interceptor systems had not yet demonstrated their full effectiveness in
real-world conditions.
These were the principal conclusions
that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee brought
back from their annual visit to the United States in January of 2009. The
delegation, composed of 33 members of parliament from 17 NATO member states and
led by Committee Chairman Julio Miranda Calha, visited Washington for
discussions with the 111th Congress, senior career executive branch officials,
and independent experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS).
In addition, the delegation visited the
headquarters of the Missile Defence Agency (MDA) and conducted site visits of
the Missile Defence Integrated Operations Center at Schriever Air Force Base in
Colorado and the missile defence interceptors based at Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California.
I.TRANSITION
The
Committee’s visit began on the seventh day of the Obama Administration. With
very few senior members of the new foreign policy team in place, and with the
overwhelming focus on the economic crisis, the transition was very much
unfinished, and little could definitively be said on the policies of the new
administration.
That said, President Obama himself has
made clear that Afghanistan will be a major focus of his administration, and it
was widely expected that other Allies would be asked to ‘match’ the new
American commitments, perhaps at the April NATO Summit.
A renewed focus on alliances and
multilateralism was also evident in the rhetoric of the incoming foreign policy
team including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defence
Robert Gates, as well as a desire for a better relationship with Russia and
progress on issues such as the expiring START Treaty.
II.MISSILE DEFENCE
The U.S. has been spending money on
missile defence programs continuously since the 1950s, regardless of which
party controlled the White House or Congress, an expert from the Congressional
Research Service reminded the delegation. The evidence demonstrated a fair
degree of consensus between the executive and legislative branches on funding
these efforts, particularly over the last 10 to 15 years.
An important distinction was made
between on the one hand the shorter-range missile defence systems such as
Aegis, Patriot, and THAAD, which had been extensively and successfully tested
and fielded in cooperation with U.S. partners around the world, and on the
other hand long-range defensive systems such as the ground-based interceptors
deployed in California and Alaska and proposed for Poland, which had a spottier
record of testing and performance to date.
The overall consensus on the potential
utility of missile defence writ large was in large part based on the general
bipartisan agreement on the potential threat from Iran, according to experts.
Missile Defence Agency Director Lt Gen Patrick O’Reilly emphasized that his
organization had no mandate or funding to pursue defences against Chinese or
Russian capabilities.
Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher affirmed
that the evolution of Iranian ballistic missile programs had become a present
threat to NATO Allies, and called for close cooperation between the US and its
Allies to counter this threat from short and medium-range missiles.
Specifically, the proposed NATO point-defence system should evolve beyond the
protection of potentially deployed forces to a system that could protect NATO’s
southern flank as a whole.
Last year, Congress funded the Bush
Administration’s requests on long-range missile defence, with several
conditions: that the Czech and Polish parliaments had to ratify relevant
agreements with the US; and that the missile defence interceptors must be
certified as operationally effective before their deployment.
Concerns about the characterization of
the outcome of recent tests of the ground-based long range interceptors troubled
some observers of the program. Military officials, however, assured the
delegation that the testing program was far from complete and that the
technology was continually improving through increasingly more challenging
operational testing conditions. This was especially the case for the two-stage
interceptor planned for use in the proposed European interceptor site.
Experts believed that the Obama
Administration is likely to take a more deliberate approach on missile defence
deployment, including renewed stringency in testing and acquisition rules, and
consideration of the defences’ utility within the overall context of US
strategic concerns, including the relationship with Russia. Of course, the
need for the defences also largely depends on the perception of threat from
Iran; it was simply too early to tell how the Obama Administration assessed
Iran’s actions and intent.
III.AFGHANISTAN
Defence Department officials
acknowledged that 2008 had been a difficult year in Afghanistan, with violent
attacks increasing by 40%, and suggest that 2009 may well see the same level of
violence or higher. While, until recently, efforts had centred on developing
national-level capacity and capabilities, a shift was underway towards greater
focus on the provincial and district levels. The voter registration process in
advance of the Presidential elections scheduled for August had gone very well,
with nearly no insurgent violence against the process itself and millions of
Afghans registered.
The State Department also acknowledged
continued difficulties in Afghanistan, but also underlined important elements
of progress, including the most effective line-up of Governors in the country
in years; the thousands of kilometres of roads built by the international
community and the economic activity that they allowed; and improvements in the
previously problematic police training programs. In addition, poppy production
was predicted to drop another 30% in 2009, an encouraging sign that programs to
reduce this problem were headed in the right direction.
Independent analyst Anthony Cordesman
foresaw a near doubling of U.S. resources in Afghanistan in 2009, based on the
likely outcomes of several ongoing policy reviews. He suggested that most
independent assessments of progress were grim and indicated that losing the war
remained a real possibility. The goals set out in the Afghan Compact, he
argued, were simply unrealistic and unachievable. However, with more effective
organization, he argued success (albeit carefully defined) was still possible,
through an increase in the mix of US and NATO forces in the field, ramped up
development of Afghan security forces, and incentivization of the regions of
Pakistan feeding the insurgency.
IV.RUSSIA
Officials suggested that 2008 had been
a very difficult year in relations with Russia, and underlined the continued
strains caused by Russian actions in Georgia and violations of the cease-fire
agreement, including the possible establishment of a Russian military base in
Abkhazia. However, better relations were a distinct possibility given
continued common strategic interests.
Andrew Kuchins of CSIS argued that
Russia, particularly in the current economic context, cannot afford a
neo-imperial policy and was still struggling with a post-colonial paradigm. He
suggested that the constraints placed on Moscow by massive financial
difficulties, coupled with a new approach from Washington, could lead to better
relations. However, his cautious optimism was tempered by concerns about
potential social unrest in Russia caused by the economic crisis, and the
continued demonization of the U.S. by Russian political leaders.
V.CYBER-SECURITY
Increasing dependence on information
networks designed to be open and offering anonymity is a potential threat to
the critical assets of any country today, CSIS Technology Policy Program
Director Jim Lewis told the delegation. The nature of the system gives the
advantage to the attacker rather than the defenders. The market had failed to
secure the system and active government policies were required to defend a
nation’s cyberspace, just as a nation’s borders needed a proper defence.
The most dangerous threats, according
to Lewis, were from foreign intelligence services, particularly those of China
and Russia; they are well resourced and equipped and have demonstrated their
capabilities through several successful attacks. A second threatening group,
cyber-criminals, have reached the level of sophistication of a mid-level state
attacker, and when coupled with a thriving black market where capabilities can
be rented by the hour, represent a major threat to governments.
Beyond the critical issue of the
penetration of a government’s classified networks, the potentially damaging
effects of cyber-attacks are on three levels: at the political level, where
they can cause a loss of confidence in a national government’s ability to
respond to crisis; in economic terms, where lost intellectual property through
espionage activities can be extremely damaging; and finally through the
disruption of physical services such as an electrical grid.
Lewis suggested proper public messaging
by governments (deterrence for enemies, reassurance for domestic publics), as
well as increased and clear legal penalties for attackers. Equally important
was to work on the problem of attributing attacks to their source, as well as
increased multilateral international cooperation among like-minded states to
ensure rapid and effective cooperation during attacks and the development of
norms and standards on cyber-security.
Other issues the delegation discussed
with interlocutors included the evolution of American policy in Iraq; larger
Middle East issues including the conflict in Gaza and its implications and the
overall diplomatic approach towards Iran; U.S. non-proliferation policy;
prospective appointments of individuals to key U.S. policy posts; and the
impact of the financial crisis on various strategic concerns.
The Defence and Security Committee’s
meetings included:
Parliamentary Dialogue
Meeting on Transatlantic relations with
the U.S. Delegation to the NATO PA, led by NATO PA President John Tanner
Meeting on Congressional views on
missile defence issues led by Rep. Ellen Tauscher, Chairwoman of the
NATO PA Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities and Chair of
the U.S. Strategic Forces Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Armed
Services
U.S. Department of Defence Officials
Peter F. Verga, Acting Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy
Mary Burce Warlick, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for European and NATO
Policy
Bobby J Wilkes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Central Asia
Christopher C. Straub, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (Middle East) designate
Dr. Peppino A. Debiaso, Director, Office of Missile Defence Policy
U.S. Department of State Officials
William J. Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Marcie Ries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs
Pat Moon,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Affairs
Ian Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Military
Site Visits
Missile Defence Agency Headquarters- Lt
Gen Patrick O’Reilly, Director
Missile Defence Integrated Operations
Center (MDIOC), Schriever Air Force Base
United States Air Force Academy (USAFA)
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California: visit of the Ground Based Interceptor and related
facilities
Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Carl Ek,
Specialist in European Affairs in the Europe and Americas Section
Steve Hildreth, Specialist in Missile Defence Policy for the Defence Policy and
Arms Control Section
Nate Lucas, Research Manager for the Defence Policy and Arms Control Section
Vince Morelli, Research Manager for the Europe and the Americas Section
Center for Strategic and International
Studies
Julianne Smith, Director, Europe Program
Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
Andrew Kuchins, Director, Russia Program
Jim Lewis, Director, Technology Policy Program
Respectfully submitted,
Mr. Leon Benoit, M.P.
Chair
Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (NATO PA)